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LIFE AFTER BILSKI† 
Mark A. Lemley,* Michael Risch,** Ted Sichelman*** & 
R. Polk Wagner**** 
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court declined calls to categorically ex-
clude business methods—or any technology—from the patent law. It also rejected 
as the sole test of subject matter eligibility the Federal Circuit’s deeply-flawed 
machine-or-transformation test, under which no process is patentable unless it is 
tied to a particular machine or transforms an article to another state or thing. 
Subsequent developments threaten to undo that holding, however. Relying on the 
Court’s description of the Federal Circuit test as a “useful and important clue,” 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, patent litigants, and district courts have 
all continued to rely on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake of Bilski: 
no longer as the sole rule, but as a presumptive starting point that threatens to ef-
fectively become mandatory. In this Article, we suggest a new way to understand 
the exclusion of abstract ideas from patentable subject matter. No class of inven-
tion is inherently too abstract for patenting. Rather, the rule against patenting 
abstract ideas is an effort to prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too 
broadly. By requiring that patent claims be limited to a specific set of practical 
applications of an idea, the abstract ideas doctrine both makes the scope of the 
resulting patent clearer and leaves room for subsequent inventors to improve 
upon—and patent new applications of—the same basic principle. Recasting the 
abstract ideas doctrine as an overclaiming test eliminates the constraints of the 
artificial machine-or-transformation test, as well as the pointless effort to fit in-
ventions into permissible or impermissible categories. It also helps understand 
some otherwise-inexplicable distinctions in the case law. Testing for overclaim-
ing allows courts to focus on what really matters: whether the scope of the paten-
tee’s claims are commensurate with the invention’s practical, real-world contri-
bution. This inquiry, we suggest, is the touchstone of the abstract ideas analysis, 
and the way out of the post-Bilski confusion.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court rejected calls to categorically ex-
clude business methods—or any technology—from the scope of patent law.1 It 
also rejected as the sole test of subject matter eligibility the Federal Circuit’s 
deeply-flawed machine-or-transformation test, under which no process, and 
perhaps no invention of any type, is patentable unless it is tied to a particular 
machine or transforms an article to another state or thing.2 Nonetheless, the 
Court held that the machine-or-transformation test still “is a useful and impor-
tant clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inven-
tions” are patentable subject matter.3 The result was a (narrow) victory for in-
ventors, as well as for context-specific standards over formal rules. 
Subsequent developments threaten to undo that win, however. Relying on 
the Court’s “useful and important clue” language, the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO), patent litigants, and district courts have all continued to re-
ly on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake of Bilski: no longer as the 
sole rule, but as a presumptive starting point that threatens to become effective-
ly mandatory. Put simply, the problem is that no one understands what makes 
an idea “abstract,”4 and hence ineligible for patent protection, so decisionmak-
ers fall back on the one test that has been articulated.  
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 2. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 3. 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
 4. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process 
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010) (providing an ex-
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In this Article, we suggest a new way to understand the exclusion of ab-
stract ideas from patentable subject matter. No class of invention is inherently 
too abstract for patenting. Rather, the rule against patenting abstract ideas is 
best understood as an effort to prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too 
broadly. By requiring that patent claims be limited to a specific set of practical 
applications of an idea, the abstract ideas doctrine both makes the scope of the 
resulting patent clearer and leaves room for subsequent inventors to improve 
upon—and patent new applications of—the same basic principle. 
Understanding the abstract ideas doctrine as an overclaiming test elimi-
nates the constraints of the artificial machine-or-transformation rule, as well as 
the pointless effort to fit inventions into permissible and impermissible catego-
ries. It also helps understand some otherwise-inexplicable distinctions in the 
case law. A focus on overclaiming allows courts to focus on what really mat-
ters: whether the scope of the patentee’s claims is commensurate with the in-
vention’s practical, real-world contribution, rather than asserting coverage over 
general ideas unmoored to a specific application. This inquiry, we suggest, is 
the touchstone of the abstract ideas analysis, and the way out of the post-Bilski 
confusion.  
 In Part I, we discuss the rise, fall, and apparent rebirth of the Federal 
Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test, and explain why it is so problematic. 
In Part II, we offer a new way of thinking about abstract ideas, one focused on 
the scope of the patentee’s claims rather than the category of the invention. In 
Part III, we apply our test to a variety of current cases and problems. 
I. THE RETURN OF MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION  
A. The History of Patenting Software 
The patentability of software and business methods has a long and tortured 
history. Put extremely briefly: The Supreme Court in the 1970s struggled with 
mathematical algorithm and software patents, first refusing to patent a mathe-
matical algorithm,5 but later holding that a process could be patented even 
though its novel elements included software so long as that software was tied to 
a particular machine.6 After these cases, the Supreme Court got out of the busi-
ness of patentable subject matter for nearly thirty years.7 
 
planation of considerations to use in determining subject matter eligibility of method claims 
in view of the abstract idea exception). 
 5. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 65, 71-72 (1972).  
 6. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 191-93 (1981) (“On the other hand, 
when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a 
structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the 
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different 
state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101 . . . . [W]e do not view res-
LEMLEY-63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2011 1:10 PM 
1318 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1315 
Through the 1980s and 1990s, courts gradually eroded the requirement that 
a software invention be tied to a particular machine.8 Finally, in 1998, in State 
Street, the Federal Circuit eliminated any such requirement, holding that both 
software alone and business methods were patentable regardless of the form in 
which they were implemented, if the invention produced a “useful, concrete, 
and tangible result,” even one expressed in numbers.9 
For a decade after 1998, patentable subject matter was effectively a dead 
letter. That changed dramatically in 2008 when the Federal Circuit decided In 
re Bilski en banc. The case involved a patent application on a method of hedg-
ing risk in the sale of commodities. The patent application also included depen-
dent claims that limit the method to use in the energy industry and one depen-
dent claim that offers a formula for calculating risk-adjusted prices. The Feder-
Federal Circuit ruled, eleven to one, that Bilski’s claimed method of hedging 
financial risk was unpatentable.10 
The Federal Circuit crafted what has come to be known as the machine-or-
transformation test: “A claimed process is . . . patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) 
it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular 
article into a different state or thing.”11  
Moreover, even if a process meets this test, it is unpatentable if the ma-
chine or transformation is merely incidental extra-solution activity.12 And an 
invention that preempts all use of a law of nature or algorithm, even in a partic-
ular field of use, is not patentable even if it would otherwise survive the test. 
Purporting to derive this test from Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Cir-
cuit displaced all prior tests for patentable subject matter, including State 
Street’s “useful, concrete, and tangible result” analysis.13 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed that Bilski’s invention 
was unpatentable as an abstract idea.14 However, the Court rejected the ma-
chine-or-transformation analysis as the exclusive test of patentability,15 though 
 
pondents’ claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to 
an industrial process for the molding of rubber products . . . .”). 
 7. The one exception—J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 
124 (2001)—involved the interaction of the patent statute with other specialized statutes pro-
tecting plants. 
 8. For a discussion of this history, see Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 9. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). While there were three dis-
sents, only Judge Pauline Newman would have found the claims to be patentable subject 
matter. 
 11. Id. at 954. 
 12. See id. at 957. 
 13. Id. at 959-61. 
 14. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229-30 (2010). 
 15. See id. at 3227. 
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all the Justices thought that the test was an “important clue” to patentability.16 
Alas, the Court’s majority did not provide additional guidance on why Bilski’s 
invention was unpatentable.17  
B. The Persistence of the Machine-or-Transformation Test 
Patent owners narrowly dodged a bullet in Bilski. No one except perhaps 
Bilski himself thought that he would get a patent.18 However, four Justices 
would have held business methods unpatentable altogether,19 and in the course 
of doing so would have substantially limited patentable subject matter. Thus, 
the fact that Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court rejected strict application 
of the machine-or-transformation test and left open the prospect of patenting 
software and business methods led early commentators to declare it a victory 
for patent owners in those industries.20 
In fact, the PTO and the few district courts to have decided cases since 
Bilski have continued to apply the machine-or-transformation test. For exam-
ple, in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, the claims related to the process of 
displaying copyrighted media in exchange for watching certain advertising.21 
The district court held that “even though the machine or transformation is no 
longer the litmus test for patentability, the Court will use it here as a key indica-
tor of patentability.”22  
The PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) has similarly 
focused on the machine-or-transformation test in analyzing post-Bilski 
claims.23 In Ex parte Tse-Huong Choo, the BPAI rejected a claim that it found 
“can exist solely in software and data structures.”24 More importantly, the 
 
 16. Id. at 3227; id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 3258 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 17. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Waiting for Bilski: A Patent Story 5 (July 12, 2010) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1650061 (“In the end, [Bilski] tells Bar and Academy nothing more than has already been 
said. The men remain in the same fog of confusion.”). 
 18. In fact, the Bilski patent had a co-inventor, Rand Warsaw. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3218. However, for simplicity, we assume in the text that Bilski was the sole inventor. 
 19. See id. at 3249 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Indeed, many believe that 
the concurrence was originally to be the majority opinion. 
 20. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No 
Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to 
Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289 (2011). 
 21. See No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx), 2010 WL 3360098, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 
2010). 
 22. Id. at *3. 
 23. For a full discussion of all board opinions since Bilski, see Dave Healey, BPAI: 
Tough on Software Claims Post-Bilski, PAT. MATH (Dec. 7, 2010), http://patentmath.com/ 
bpai-tough-on-software-claims-post-bilski.  
 24. No. 2009-006352, 2010 WL 2985362, at *2 (B.P.A.I. July 28, 2010). 
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Board looked at a Beauregard claim25 and found that “merely reciting data or 
instructions on a stored computer readable medium does not make a claim sta-
tutory [subject matter] under § 101. Similarly, merely placing instructions or 
code on a computer readable medium does not render claim 24 statutory.”26 
Thus, the Board concluded that Bilski bars not just process but also article-of-
manufacture claims to software standing alone.27  
The Board has been equally strict in applying the transformation step of the 
machine-or-transformation test to software. In Ex parte Heuer, the Board re-
jected a claim to a method for decoding a binary representation of a docu-
ment.28 The BPAI found that the claims failed both prongs of the machine-or-
transformation test. It specifically looked at an “XML-based document,” “a 
simplified schema,” “a schema,” “correction code,” and “at least one decoder” 
and found that nothing in the specification indicating that they “must be hard-
ware” and that there was therefore no machine.29 On the transformation side, 
the BPAI found that “[t]he fact that Appellants’ XML-based document is de-
coded using the claimed ‘namespace’ or the claimed ‘simplified schema’ fails 
to qualify as a transformation of an article of manufacture consistent with the 
second prong of the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test.”30 The latter ruling 
seems to be more restrictive than the Federal Circuit decision in In re Bilski, 
since it doesn’t permit transformation of anything other than an article of manu-
facture, while the Federal Circuit had appeared willing in Bilski to allow some 
transformations of data to meet the machine-or-transformation test.31 
The PTO issued guidance in interpreting Bilski in July 2010, identifying 
various factors that could affect patentable subject matter eligibility; all of 
 
 25. Beauregard claims are directed to software stored on a medium such as a CD-
ROM claimed as an article of manufacture. See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
 26. Tse-Huong Choo, 2010 WL 2985362, at *5 (citations omitted); accord Ex parte 
Kelkar, No. 2009-004635, 2010 WL 3768175 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010). 
 27. See also Ex parte Christian, No. 2009-006589, 2010 WL 3389297, at *2 (B.P.A.I. 
Aug. 23, 2010) (“A claim that recites no more than software, logic, or a data structure (i.e. an 
abstraction) does not fall within any statutory category. . . . ‘Abstract software code is an 
idea without physical embodiment.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449 (2007))); Ex parte Ramanujam, No. 2009-002483, 2010 WL 
3214559, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 12, 2010) (finding that claims “are therefore directed to soft-
ware per se, which falls outside the scope of patentable subject matter”); Ex parte Caccavale, 
No. 2009-006026, 2010 WL 2901727, at *5 (B.P.A.I. July 23, 2010) (“Claim 8 simply fails 
to recite that the computations are performed by the ‘distributed processing units’ or any 
other machine in claim 8.”). Contra Ex parte Russo, No. 2009-001876, 2010 WL 3441058 
(B.P.A.I. Aug. 30, 2010) (holding a system claim directed to data structures unpatentable, 
but a Beauregard claim to the same data structures patentable). 
 28. No. 2009-004590, 2010 WL 3072973 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 2010); accord Ex parte 
Venkata, No. 2009-007302 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 5, 2010); Ex parte MacKenzie, No. 2009-007332 
(B.P.A.I. Oct. 4, 2010). 
 29. Heuer, 2010 WL 3072973, at *8. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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those factors relate generally to the machine-or-transformation test or are im-
plementations of it.32 We have heard reports that patent examiners are more le-
nient than the Board generally has been, allowing claims to general-purpose 
computers programmed with software and rejecting only pure software 
claims.33 But by the nature of the appellate process, it is the Board decisions 
that are likely to shape the law in future cases.  
In December 2010, the Federal Circuit decided Research Corp. Technolo-
gies v. Microsoft Corp., holding that software method claims directed to a 
process of “halftoning” printed images were not unpatentable abstract ideas be-
cause the invention “presents functional and palpable applications in the field 
of computer technology.”34 The opinion noted that other (unasserted) claims in 
the patent required the use of specific machines, demanded evidence that the 
claim be “manifestly abstract” before holding it invalid, and went so far as to 
suggest that “inventions with specific applications or improvements to technol-
ogies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract” as to fail § 101.35 The 
court did not apply the machine-or-transformation test, and indeed suggested 
(wrongly) that the Supreme Court had rejected that test as nonstatutory.36 The 
court suggested that § 112 may better serve the goal of limiting overbroad 
claim language.37  
Research Corp. is an encouraging sign that the machine-or-transformation 
test may not dominate the post-Bilski landscape. Indeed, it might suggest a re-
turn to the State Street form of analysis. But some caution is warranted. The 
case was written by Judge Rader, and joined by Judge Newman, the two judges 
who dissented from the machine-or-transformation test in In re Bilski. It con-
tains some specious reasoning that is hard to square with prior court precedent, 
such as its conclusion that structural limitations in dependent claims render pa-
tentable different, independent claims that lack those limitations.38 And it does 
 
 32. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject-Matter Eligibility for Process 
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010). 
 33. One Board opinion supports this more lenient approach. See Ex parte Ulf, No. 
2009-008071, 2010 WL 3611779, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 7, 2010) (“Dependent claim 4 expli-
citly recites ‘an inquiry, made on an opportunity reservation computer database.’ In particu-
lar, since a computer is required to query a computer database, we find evidence that the me-
thod steps of dependent claim 4 are implemented on a ‘machine.’ Therefore, claim 4 is tied 
to a ‘machine’ consistent with the bounds of the machine-or-transformation test.”). But see 
Ex parte Aklilu, No. 2009-007075, 2010 WL 4315178, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 29, 2010) 
(“[M]ere use of a generic machine or a general purpose computer to perform the steps of an 
otherwise unpatentable algorithm is not sufficient to meet the requirements for § 101 statuto-
ry subject matter.”). 
 34. 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 35. Id. at 869. 
 36. See id. at 868. 
 37. See id. at 869. 
 38. See id. (“The fact that some claims in the ’310 and ’228 patents require a ‘high 
contrast film,’ ‘a film printer,’ ‘a memory,’ and ‘printer and display devices’ also confirm 
[sic] this court’s holding that the invention is not abstract.”). 
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not offer a detailed test of its own, instead simply holding that the claims at is-
sue are not abstract (albeit with some discussion). Given that the Federal Cir-
cuit created the machine-or-transformation test, it seems quite possible that the 
majority of the court will incline to the views of the BPAI and the district 
courts that the machine-or-transformation test continues to govern in most in-
stances, distinguishing Research Corp. on its facts. 
Indeed, some reason to think that likely came just over a week later, in 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services.39 The court 
there reaffirmed the patentability of a method for optimizing drug dosages dur-
ing therapy. But in doing so, the Federal Circuit held that the Supreme Court 
“did not disavow the machine-or-transformation test” and had instead indicated 
“that ‘[t]ransformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing 
is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular 
machines.’”40 The contradictory statements of the Federal Circuit in Research 
Corp. and Prometheus suggest that the role of the machine-or-transformation 
test will be at least subject to ongoing debate. 
C. The Perils of the Machine-or-Transformation Test 
The machine-or-transformation test is problematic. It contains a number of 
ambiguities, leads to some bizarre results, and poorly tracks the stated goal of 
preventing the patenting of abstract ideas. 
First the ambiguities. Does the machine-or-transformation test apply only 
to process claims? The prior Supreme Court cases in Benson, Flook, and Diehr 
were all process claims.41 The Federal Circuit decision in In re Bilski distin-
guishes In re Nuijten as directed to an article of manufacture, not a process,42 
but does not do the same for In re Alappat, an en banc decision holding that a 
new computer program automatically makes a general-purpose computer “a 
new machine.”43 The BPAI and the district courts have generally held that the 
machine-or-transformation test is not limited to process claims. And there is no 
logical reason to cabin the holding to process claims; Benson and Diehr were 
process claims, but the Court’s analysis did not focus on that fact. If the ma-
chine-or-transformation test were limited to process claims, it would generally 
 
 39. 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 40. Id. at 1355 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 
S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010)) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 42. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). The court 
dodged the question about whether Nuijten’s process for creating signals sufficed. 
 43. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); see In re Bilski, 545 
F.3d at 958-60. 
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be easy to draft around; most computer-implemented process claims can be re-
written as a machine or article of manufacture claims.44  
Second, is a general-purpose computer a “specific machine,” as per Alap-
pat? The Federal Circuit expressly reserved this question in In re Bilski.45 If it 
is, Bilski arguably invalidates tens of thousands of existing patents but will be 
easy to draft around in the future. But it would be a bit odd to say that Bilski’s 
hedging method becomes patentable if he adds “in a computer” at the end. The 
BPAI has mostly (and the district courts have unanimously) read Bilski to say 
that a general-purpose computer is not enough, though patent examiners have 
reportedly been more forgiving of such claims.46 
If these ambiguities are resolved—as they seem to have been so far—by 
concluding that you cannot evade the machine-or-transformation test by adding 
the phrase “in a computer” or by redrafting the claim as a system claim, the 
machine element of the machine-or-transformation test appears to be quite re-
strictive. That in turn leads to some bizarre results. It will lead to efforts to draft 
claims to software run on specific machines, but—since the computer used is 
irrelevant in most software patents—patentees may try to write dozens of 
claims, each to a specific “machine” implementing their program. If that works, 
owners of existing patents will find their claims invalid because they didn’t use 
the “magic words,”47 but going forward the strategy may allow patentees to 
approximate the effect of claiming their software on a general-purpose comput-
er. If it doesn’t work, the law will be drawing artificial distinctions between 
programs of equivalent inventiveness. For example, it seems pointless to say 
that the same software invention is patentable if it works only in an MRI ma-
chine but unpatentable if otherwise-identical software can be run on a PC. 
At the same time, application of that rule seems underinclusive. Suppose 
we write a new song.48 Can we patent it? Not as such, but arguably the song 
could pass the machine-or-transformation test if we record it using an iTunes 
codec and claim it as a method implemented digitally on an MP3 player. After 
all, the song is claimed only on particular machines specially designed for that 
purpose.49 How about the arbitration process in Comiskey?50 Does it really be-
 
 44. A process that is implemented in a computer can be claimed either as a process or 
as a computer system that is programmed to perform the steps of the process. Only the form 
has changed.  
 45. See 545 F.3d at 962 (“We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise con-
tours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular questions, such as 
whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular ma-
chine.”). 
 46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 47. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 8, at 9 (describing the “doctrine of the magic 
words”). 
 48. Don’t worry, we haven’t. 
 49. Cf. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Through the expedient of putting his music on known structure, 
can a composer now claim as his invention the structure of a compact disc or player piano 
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come patentable if run on a particular computer? We are confident that the 
adopters of the machine-or-transformation test didn’t intend those results. A 
specific machine seems an unnecessary limitation in some cases, and an insuf-
ficient one in others. The reason is the same in both cases: the test is focusing 
on the tail (the prior art machine with which the new invention works) and ig-
noring the dog (the new invention itself). 
Application of the transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation 
test produces even more bizarre results. What does it mean to transform some-
thing “to another state or thing”? The Federal Circuit in In re Bilski expressly 
rejected the idea from Comiskey that physical steps are required.51 But it also 
seemed to reimport that limitation by talking about machines or transformations 
of articles. The result is ambiguity whether a physical thing, or merely a rela-
tionship among things, needs to be transformed. Is FedEx patentable subject 
matter because packages are moved from place to place, or must the packages 
themselves be changed? Is a method of swinging a golf putter transformative 
because it results in a golf ball being moved to a different place than it other-
wise would have been?52  
The Federal Circuit decision in In re Bilski suggests—mostly—that trans-
formation requires some physical change to the patented thing itself. The Su-
preme Court language from which it is taken, after all, speaks of 
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing.”53 
Carving wood into a chair “transforms” it into a new thing—a chair. Chemical 
reactions change the state of the chemicals involved. But there remains the 
problem of whether the transformation is sufficient, especially with respect to 
process claims. 
Unfortunately, the analysis becomes even more confusing. Despite the pre-
ference for physical transformation, the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski (in its 
oddest passage) concludes that transforming data itself can meet this test in cer-
tain circumstances. Citing Abele, the court distinguishes between invalid gener-
al claims to outputting data results and valid specific claims to outputting par-
ticular data made using a particular machine.54 The court endorses the latter as 
long as the data “represents physical objects or substances.”55 The machine is 
the same, the transformation is the same—a computer has different bits set than 
it otherwise would, which means that the electrical impulses across gates on its 
 
roll containing the melody he discovered and obtain a patent therefor? The answer must be 
no.”). 
 50. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 51. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960-61 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 52. Cf. Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Indus-
try Norms, 2009 BYU L. REV. 875, 876 (describing the throwing of a curve ball as transfor-
mative). 
 53. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. 
 55. Id. 
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chips are in a different array. But to the Federal Circuit the result is transforma-
tive if, but only if, the data these bits refer to represents a physical thing. Kevin 
Collins has referred to this as meta-tangibility: the question is not whether the 
invention is tangible, but whether the intangible invention refers to something 
that is itself tangible.56 
Coal (the subject of the contracts in Bilski) is plainly a real-world physical 
thing. Would claim 1 in Bilski survive if it added a reference to the physical 
thing that was the subject of the contract? If an algorithm can only be used in a 
computer (as in Benson), does displaying the results from that algorithm render 
the invention patentable? This approach makes no sense. As with the machine 
prong, the transformation test is not focused on the invention, but on something 
external to it. 
The Federal Circuit created this meta-tangibility data transformation excep-
tion to explain the result in In re Abele.57 That case held that a narrow claim 
directed to a program that displayed the results of a CAT scan was patentable 
subject matter, but that a broad claim that purported to patent the use of a calcu-
lation to shade display images was not.58 But as described in In re Bilski, the 
distinction is illogical. 
To presage our argument in Part II, the real issue in Abele is not whether 
the information being displayed relates to something physical. The issue is 
overclaiming. Tailored claims should survive even if they aren’t transforming 
anything physical, but broad claims that encompass any sort of data shouldn’t. 
But that’s not the way it works under the machine-or-transformation test. If we 
hope to limit patentable subject matter in a predictable and rational way, the 
machine-or-transformation test is not the way to do it. In the next Part, we in-
troduce our alternative. 
II. THE THEORY OF SUBJECT MATTER RESTRICTIONS  
Patent eligibility requires that the subject matter clear two primary hurdles. 
First, each claim must fall within one of the statutory buckets: process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter.59 These groupings are categori-
cal—either a claim falls within the statute or it does not. 
Second, each claim must fall outside of one of the common law exceptions: 
abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena.60 It is here that Bilski 
and its predecessors are the most opaque: each case purports to grant or deny 
 
 56. See Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on In re Bilski: Tangibility Gone 
Meta, PATENTLY-O BLOG, 1 (Nov. 1, 2008), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/           
collinsmetabilski.pdf. 
 57. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63. 
 58. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 59. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 60. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
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eligibility to a particular patent claim, but fails to provide guidance about how 
to handle the next claim.61 Bilski makes clear that while the Supreme Court has 
no intention of abandoning these old exceptions, neither does it intend to pro-
vide further guidance. Perhaps even worse, the guidance we have from the ma-
chine-or-transformation test isn’t helping. A principled theory is needed. 
A. Prior Subject Matter Theories 
The traditional way academics think about patentable subject matter is as a 
gatekeeper: a means of excluding certain types of inventions entirely from the 
scope of patent protection.62 Gatekeeping approaches have proven unsatisfacto-
ry. While they may serve to reduce administrative and judicial costs in deter-
mining eligible subject matter, gatekeeping theories are necessarily bright-line 
rules: they will both exclude some patents that should be granted and fail to ex-
clude others that should not. We think this unwise. The core mission of patent 
law is to create incentives for the production, disclosure, and commercialization 
of socially valuable inventions. The flexibility of any subject matter require-
ment is paramount given the rapidly changing nature of technology. For exam-
ple, prior to Bilski, the Court last considered the scope of patentable subject 
matter in 1981, based on inventions made nearly a decade earlier.63 At the time 
those inventions were made, the biotechnology and personal computer indus-
tries were just starting, there was no such thing as a cell phone, and the Internet 
was something used by only a few computer scientists at universities. Had the 
Court created an inflexible rule in 1981 governing the patentability of software 
or communications technologies from 1970, that rule could have had a range of 
 
 61. See generally Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 649 
(2008) (noting that current subject matter rules “cannot be applied narrowly”). 
 62. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Claims to Information Qua Information and a 
Structural Theory of Section 101, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 11 (2008); Kevin 
Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317 (2007); Kevin Emerson Col-
lins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1378 (2010); 
Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Business-
Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823 (2003); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection 
for Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on 
Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 86-87 (1999); Menell, supra note 20, at 
1312-13 (arguing that patents should be limited to the technological arts); David S. Olson, 
Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable 
Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 184 (2009); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: 
The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related 
Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1042-43 (1990); Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, 
“Clues” for Determining Whether Business and Service Innovations Are Unpatentable Ab-
stract Ideas, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 110 (2010) (arguing that business methods should 
generally be unpatentable despite Bilski); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Pro-
fessions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Inventions After 
Bilski: History and Theory (Feb. 07, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1757272.  
 63. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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unintended consequences, preventing the patenting of important new inventions 
in a wide range of fields. Quite simply, innovation in industry must necessarily 
include innovation in applied processes.  
Furthermore, gatekeeping rules don’t have very clear lines;64 subject mat-
ter category delineation is notoriously elusive. There is no clear division be-
tween “software” and “nonsoftware” patents, or a computer system that imple-
ments a “business method” and one that implements another type of process, or 
between “technological” and “nontechnological” inventions. Lack of rigidity is 
not inherently bad; we suggest a flexible, factors-based test ourselves. But be-
cause gatekeeping rules attempt to draw conceptual lines around classes of 
technology with unclear boundaries—instead of using the policy-based factors 
that should drive patentable subject matter determinations—the result is a set of 
tests that overexclude and underexclude in a costly and haphazard way.  
One of us has gone so far as to argue that the best solution is to abandon all 
exceptions, including the historical ones.65 Whether or not this approach is cor-
rect, it is unlikely to gain judicial support in light of Bilski. Therefore, we take 
the common law abstract ideas exception as a given, and seek to articulate a 
reason to preclude patentability for abstract ideas and a corresponding way to 
recognize when patent claims are too abstract. We recognize that this better 
way has been elusive. Even those commentators who agree that the abstract 
ideas exception is a scope limitation device fail to provide a principled way to 
apply the standard.66 Instead, they usually rely on § 112 of the Patent Act, con-
flating overbreadth for patentable subject matter purposes with enablement and 
written description.67 
 
 64. Even the categories in the Patent Act are sometimes difficult to apply. See, e.g., 
Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1931) (determining whether an 
orange dipped in borax is a “manufacture”); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353-57 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (determining whether an electrical signal falls into a statutory category). 
 65. See Risch, supra note 61, at 591. 
 66. For example, T.J. Chiang argues that patentable subject matter encompasses both 
gatekeeping and scope limitations, and suggests that the abstract ideas exclusion is primarily 
a scope limitation. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1363, 1381. He does not, however, attempt to articulate the scope-
limitation analysis. For other scope-related theories of patentable subject matter, see, for ex-
ample, Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 
323, 387-89 (2010); Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive Patentable Software: Are There Still 
Diehr or Was It Just a Flook?, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 363, 365 n.8 (1993); Bryan Treglia, 
Separating Abstract Ideas and Laws of Nature from Patentable Subject Matter, 48 
JURIMETRICS J. 427, 434-37 (2008). 
 67. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s Business 
Method Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope 8-10 (Oct. 27, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698633. 
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B. Abstract Ideas as Scope Limitation 
We start with the unremarkable observation that the statutory categories 
outlined in § 101—”process, machine, manufacture, and composition of mat-
ter”—are of relatively limited usefulness in analyzing whether a patent claim 
falls within patentable subject matter. Indeed, because patent claims almost 
never fall outside of the four fundamental categories of § 101, when they do it 
is noteworthy. For example, in In re Nuijten, the Federal Circuit held that an 
electrical signal alone—not tied to any storage or transmission medium—did 
not fall within any of the categories.68 We might also think of the per se bars 
against claims that encompass laws of nature and no more, like gravity and re-
lativity, as similar in kind: such claims are not patentable subject matter be-
cause, without more, they are usually not processes, machines, manufactures, 
or compositions of matter. By contrast, there is no per se bar to patenting laws 
of nature as applied in a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter. As a general matter, the traditional examples of barred subject matter 
are typically the easy cases. The harder (and more pressing) question is how to 
analyze claims falling within the statutory categories.  
This is the role for the common law exceptions to patentable subject mat-
ter: excluding, for policy reasons, claims to subject matter irrespective of their 
categorical status. And in order to appropriately apply the exceptions, one must 
first understand their theory and the particular policy problem they are address-
ing.  
In our view, the abstract ideas exception is directed to an inherent tension 
between two major policy goals of the patent system. First, inventors should be 
entitled to claim all that they have actually invented (or at least all that they 
have taught to the world via their patent disclosure)—thereby implementing the 
incentive structure that lies at the heart of the patent grant. Limiting inventors 
to the particular machine they developed would make patents a “hollow and 
useless thing.”69 Second, we want to further the progress of society by conti-
nually growing the storehouse of knowledge. In some cases, these goals can be 
in substantial tension—particularly where a patentee’s claimed invention would 
curtail access to ideas that are in essence reserved to society.  
But what ideas are reserved to society? Those that are fundamental, the 
building blocks of human thought: “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamen-
tal truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can 
claim in either of them an exclusive right.”70 Importantly, patentees can and 
 
 68. 500 F.3d at 1351, 1353. Even that conclusion was questionable as a matter of 
physics and statutory interpretation. John F. Duffy, In re Nuijten: Patentable Subject Matter, 
Textualism and the Supreme Court, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Feb. 5, 2007), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/DuffyOnNuijten.pdf. Even so, the policy consequences of 
holding that a signal is “made” whenever it passes through a wire would have been dire.  
 69. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
 70. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853). 
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often do employ abstract ideas or scientific principles to a useful and practical 
end, and when they do they are entitled to a patent. The worry is not that an in-
ventor controls the application of an abstract idea, but only that an inventor ob-
tains rights over the idea itself. That is, the abstract ideas exception operates 
where a patent claim is “too broad” in the sense that it encroaches upon socie-
ty’s right to unfettered access to scientific truths, fundamental principles, and 
the like; these properly belong in the commons upon which future innovations 
can be built, “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”71  
This concern about overbreadth is not, we think, limited to the abstract 
ideas doctrine; it also animates the prohibition against patenting products of na-
ture. Here, the law has repeatedly emphasized that the patent law is designed to 
protect applications of human ingenuity, not simply “nature’s handiwork.”72 
Thus, while a man-made organism is eligible for patentability,73 a natural bac-
terium is not.74 But natural products or phenomena can be patented when they 
are put to a specific new use. The boundary is neither the form of the invention 
nor its ability to “transform” nature; instead the analysis turns on whether the 
patent claims describe the application of human knowledge to a practical end, 
rather than merely identification of the existence of useful properties. In this 
way, a claim to an abstract idea is like a claim to a product of nature: not li-
mited to real-world applications of human inventiveness, and thus ineligible for 
patenting.  
Understood in this way, the abstract ideas doctrine is not about finding a 
conceptual category of inventions that is entitled to no protection at all, nor 
about determining the quality of the disclosure. Instead, it is about encouraging 
cumulative innovation and furthering societal norms regarding access to know-
ledge by preventing patentees from claiming broad ownership over fields of 
exploration rather than specific applications of those fields. Boiling these prin-
ciples down to a practical test is a more difficult task. The abstract ideas excep-
tion should disallow those claims to ideas unmoored to real-world applications, 
taking into account the extent to which the claim forecloses after-arising embo-
diments of the idea, the nature and extent of the prior art, and the level of dis-
closure by the inventor. 
C. Distinguishing the Scope Limitations in § 101 and § 112 
Patent law has other doctrines that limit the scope of claims. Section 112 
requires that a patentee claim no more than she has described in writing and 
 
 71. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 72. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980); see also Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 
at 131. 
 73. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.  
 74. See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. 
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taught others how to make and use.75 But overbreadth as a limitation on a pa-
tentable subject matter differs in motivation and effect from scope limitations 
imposed under § 112.  
First, § 112 merely examines whether the disclosure is sufficient to warrant 
the claims.76 While some claims may be too broad in light of the disclosure, 
they are not necessarily abstract ideas.77 Relatedly, enablement does not pro-
vide enough of a limitation on scope as the level of skill in the art goes up.78 
Overclaiming under § 101, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with re-
moving obstructions to follow-on innovation. The question is not whether one 
could make the embodiments claimed, but rather whether the inventor has con-
tributed enough to merit a claim so broad that others will be locked out.79  
Removing certain inventions—particularly inventive principles—from pa-
tentability diminishes burdens to follow-on inventors who might make use of 
those principles in new embodiments or applications of the principle. If we al-
lowed exclusionary rights over broad principles, later inventors wanting to em-
ploy those principles in new inventions would need to license rights to the orig-
inal patent, thereby increasing the costs to follow-on invention. The precise 
level of “abstractness” of a given claim at which follow-on invention is overly 
burdened is somewhat arbitrary.80 Nonetheless, when a patent claim would fo-
reclose all future embodiments or applications of the inventive principle 
claimed in a patent, courts have balked. That is true even if the patentee has 
enabled others to use all currently known embodiments, thus satisfying § 112. 
In the words of the Supreme Court, such claims “wholly pre-empt” all present 
and future uses of the inventive principle.81 
Second, the enablement and written description requirements of § 112 con-
cern the adequacy of the inventor’s disclosure at the time of filing. Scope con-
cerns under § 101, however, relate to the possibility of invention after filing. 
Indeed, under § 112, as long as an inventor sufficiently discloses those embo-
 
 75. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 76. See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (holding that claim 
to light filaments made from any carbonized textile or vegetable fiber was too broad in light 
of disclosure that described only one type of fiber). 
 77. See, e.g., id. While the filament claims were broader than the disclosure allowed, 
they were not abstract.  
 78. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1164-65 (2002) (arguing that judicial attribution of high skill 
level to programmers has nullified enablement requirement for software patents); Michael 
Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 127, 
138-39 (2010) (arguing that description is critical because high skill means more claims with 
less disclosure of actual invention). 
 79. One of the authors has argued that we could accomplish the same end with a more 
capacious understanding of § 112. Risch, supra note 61, at 591. But we currently do not have 
such an understanding. 
 80. See infra Part III. 
 81. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63, 72 (1972)). 
LEMLEY-63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2011 1:10 PM 
June 2011] LIFE AFTER BILSKI 1331 
diments of the invention that could have been built at the time of filing, the in-
ventor will generally be afforded exclusionary rights over later inventions that 
use after-arising technology—technology that did not exist at the time of filing. 
Section 101, on the other hand, concerns itself precisely with the degree to 
which a patent claim will foreclose later-developed technology. Thus, even an 
inventor meeting the requirements of § 112 may write a claim so broad as to 
violate § 101. This distinction in timing is critical to understanding the differ-
ences in patent scope thresholds under the two sections. 
By removing overly abstract inventions from patenting, we drive more 
competition in research and development races to complete practical, applied 
inventions. In other words, by moving patenting downstream, we both permit 
competition in research and development and encourage competition among 
the practical, applied inventions developed by that research.82 Thus, by limiting 
claims to practical applications, as opposed to broadly claimed abstract inven-
tions, we help promote the goal of stimulating optimal invention. Section 112 
may have the prevention of gun jumping as a subsidiary goal, but an overclaim-
ing view of § 101 puts the primary focus on whether the claims reflect an ap-
plied principle. 
Finally, the enablement inquiry itself is extremely difficult and fraught 
with contradiction.83 Our focus under § 101 on claim scope with an eye toward 
practical application provides for a different type of analysis. It may be that 
claims are not abstract but also not enabled (like Incandescent Lamp) or it may 
be that claims are abstract, but enabled (like Benson). 
Similarly, definiteness concerns under § 112, paragraph 2, inform but do 
not replace our standard. Definiteness asks whether a person having ordinary 
skill in the art (PHOSITA) could understand the claims, regardless of how ab-
stract or applied they might be. Bilski’s claim to hedging was understandable, 
even if it was overbroad. Under § 101, we are concerned about the uncertainty 
and vagueness of claims over abstract ideas or natural laws that could thwart 
optimal invention by closing off avenues not invented (or inventible) by the pa-
tentee. Claims that are indefinite under § 101 may be clear in their language but 
 
 82. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 127 (2009) (arguing that inventions should be reduced to practice to im-
prove commercialization); see also Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 1195, 1224-34 (discussing practical utility as a commercialization lever); Ted Sichel-
man, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (2010) (discussing incentives 
provided by patent law to commercialize inventions). 
 83. See, e.g., T.J. Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 106 NW. 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434465 (noting that determining whether a claim is enabled re-
quires us to choose the level of abstraction at which we assess that claim); Timothy R. Hol-
brook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manu-
script at 18-19), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650819; Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The 
Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1141, 1168 (2008). 
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still lead to indeterminate results because they claim activities that are not un-
der the control of the person practicing the method.84  
D. Scope Limitation in the Case Law 
In our view, the theory articulated here explains most of the major cases 
implementing the § 101 abstract ideas exception. 
1. Historic cases 
Three historic cases illustrate how excluding abstract ideas limits claim 
scope. In O’Reilly v. Morse, the Supreme Court considered Samuel Morse’s pa-
tent on the telegraph.85 It allowed what many would consider today to be a 
business method claim: “the system of signs, consisting of dots and spaces, . . . 
in combination with machinery for recording them, as signals for telegraphic 
purposes.”86 It also allowed Morse’s claim to his particular telegraph. Howev-
er, the Court denied Morse’s claim to all transmission of printed information by 
an electromagnetic signal by any means.87 While the Court had no problem 
with patenting a particular form of such transmission—the telegraph—it invali-
dated the broader claim because Morse claimed all forms of printing at a dis-
tance without tying the claim to any process or machinery disclosed in the pa-
tent.88  
It is no surprise that many consider Morse to be an enablement case.89 But 
this explanation is incomplete, because the Court’s ruling goes beyond ordinary 
application of enablement. The Court’s concern is not just undue experimenta-
tion necessary to achieve the broad claim scope.90 Nor can the case solely be 
explained on the grounds of the written description doctrine.91 Although the 
Court stated that Morse “claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process 
 
 84. There may also be distributive concerns in § 101 analysis: subject matter jurispru-
dence consistently recites that certain principles must be “free to all men.” Funk Bros. Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). This language is not present in 
enablement and definiteness cases. 
 85. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
 86. Id. at 86. 
 87. See id. at 112-17. 
 88. See id. at 113; see also id. at 118-19 (describing the importance of description of 
the patented invention).  
 89. See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 51 (2008) (presenting Morse 
at the beginning of a patent textbook section on enablement). 
 90. Cf. The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895) (holding that enablement 
is based on undue experimentation); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (de-
scribing factors to consider for undue experimentation in enablement). 
 91. Cf. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1346 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“Morse, decided under the 1836 Act, can also be interpreted as involving a separate written 
description inquiry.”). 
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which he has not described,” it goes further by stating Morse’s claim would fo-
reclose “future inventor[s]” who “may discover a mode of writing or printing at 
a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current,” that is, after-arising 
technology.92 
Written description—like enablement—is measured at the time of filing. 
Thus, even claims that meet the written description requirement will generally 
foreclose “future inventors” who find new “means” of implementing the 
claimed invention, particularly for complex inventions composed of many sep-
arate components, any one of which might be replaced by after-arising technol-
ogy that still falls within the literal scope of the claim language. Thus, the con-
cern about follow-on invention in Morse cannot merely be explained by 
standard disclosure doctrines. Morse had, after all, taught the only way known 
at the time to use magnetism to print characters at a difference, so arguably he 
had satisfied the enablement standard as we understand it today. Instead, the 
Court’s concerns require a separate theory of scope, one premised on patent 
eligibility of overly abstract claims. 
In contrast with Morse’s claim is Bell’s patent on the telephone, which was 
upheld in the Telephone Cases.93 Bell discovered that voice could be transmit-
ted over a closed circuit by varying the amplitude of the electrical signal; this 
discovery solved a problem that inventors attempting to transmit voices by 
opening and closing circuits (like the telegraph) could not solve. Bell, however, 
was a prophetic inventor who did not complete a working embodiment before 
he applied for his patent.94 Indeed, he only described one embodiment of his 
broad claims. Further, though Bell claimed two ways to transmit speech—the 
vibration and the variable resistance method—the device he described would 
only use one of the two ways, the vibration method.95 And Bell did not de-
scribe how to make a device to practice the other way.96  
Nonetheless, the Court allowed a claim to the broad process of sending 
voice using either the vibration or the variable resistance method. The Court 
focused not on Bell’s failure, but on the practical use of his principle.97 
The Telephone Cases also mix concerns of disclosure under the enable-
ment doctrine with concerns about follow-on invention. Whether Bell provided 
sufficient disclosure to support his claim is a question of enablement—and, 
perhaps, in modern parlance, of written description. But whether the claim was 
sufficiently specific—here, claiming a “practicable way of putting [the prin-
ciple] into operation”98—is a § 101 overbreadth issue, because the specificity 
 
 92. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113. 
 93. 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
 94. See id. at 535. 
 95. See id. at 538. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. at 536. 
 98. Id.  
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of the claim affects the latitude with which follow-on invention may be under-
taken. 
In this latter respect, the Court made two important statements. First, the 
Court noted that Bell was not claiming more than a very specific application of 
the principle that he invented: “Both forms of apparatus operate on a closed 
circuit by gradual changes of intensity, and not by alternately making and 
breaking the circuit . . . .”99 Second, the Court noted that the general principle 
of gradual electrical changes provided a specific, applied solution that was not 
available before.100 
Bell was entitled to the general and broad method that he discovered be-
cause he was able to describe “the exact electrical condition that must be 
created to accomplish his purpose.”101 The Court distinguished this from 
Morse’s unapplied claim to all electromagnetic transmissions by any means:  
It may be that electricity cannot be used at all for the transmission of speech 
except in the way Bell has discovered, and that therefore, practically, his pa-
tent gives him its exclusive use for that purpose, but that does not make his 
claim one for the use of electricity distinct from the particular process with 
which it is connected in his patent.102 
Here, too, the question is whether Bell attempted to claim more than a new, 
specific, practical, and applied benefit. The Court said no—the specific solution 
to a specific problem might have broad application, but it was an application of 
the inventive principle. Other inventors remained free to investigate other ways 
of communicating voice over an electric wire because Bell did not claim all 
transmissions of voice by any means or machinery.  
A third example is Mackay Radio, in which a well-known equation pre-
dicted the optimal wire lengths for receiving radio signals.103 The patentee 
(who did not discover the equation) claimed an antenna using these lengths. 
The Supreme Court held that the antenna was a patent-eligible application of 
the equation: “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is 
not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of 
knowledge of scientific truth may be.”104 The Court made clear that claim 
scope was the key factor in determining whether the antenna was patentable, 
and that the application of a known principle would be narrowly construed.105 
Mackay illustrates two fundamental points in our theory. First, practical 
applications of so-called “abstract ideas” are patentable. Second, consideration 
of a claim’s contribution to applied uses is a matter of claim scope. Applying a 
 
 99. Id. at 538. 
100. See id. at 544. 
101. Id. at 535. 
102. Id. 
103. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1939).  
104. Id. at 94. 
105. See id. 
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basic scientific principle to the construction of a useful object is patentable; 
claiming every use of that principle isn’t.  
2. Modern Supreme Court cases 
Our scope theory is also largely consistent with the Court’s more recent 
“abstract idea” decisions. In Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court invalidated a 
claim to a process for converting binary coded decimal numbers into pure bi-
nary format.106 The method was well-known, and could be done by pencil, but 
had not been implemented by computer.107 The process claim, the Court ruled, 
was simply too broad and untied to any application, especially in comparison to 
the contribution of the inventor: “Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and 
sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary 
conversion. The end use may . . . be performed through any existing machinery 
or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.”108 In short, whatever 
was new about the invention was unmoored to any practical application, such 
that it was “so abstract and sweeping” as to unduly foreclose follow-on inven-
tion, particularly that using after-arising technologies. Given the Court’s con-
cern with “unknown uses” and “future-devised machinery,” Benson cannot 
merely be explained by traditional scope and disclosure doctrines. 
Nor are technology-driven explanations of Benson as rejecting all claims 
involving software or mathematical algorithms satisfying. For just nine years 
later in Diamond v. Diehr, without repudiating Benson, the Court upheld a 
process for curing rubber even though the process incorporated a well-known 
mathematical formula about how long to cure rubber.109 Diehr is a straightfor-
ward application of our theory—Diehr’s process was tied to a specific practical 
application of the formula that did not unduly foreclose future innovation rely-
ing on the formula. 
Even the outcome, though not the methodology, in the troublesome case of 
Parker v. Flook110 might be explained by our theory. In Flook, the Court ruled 
that a claimed method for updating an alarm limit in catalytic conversion using 
a specified algorithm was unpatentable under § 101.111 The problematic aspect 
of the case is its apparent reliance on “point of novelty” analysis—treating the 
mathematical algorithms that were the novel feature of the invention as if they 
were already known. This approach is problematic in many respects,112 and for 
that reason it is tempting to dismiss the case as an outlier. Indeed, the Court’s 
 
106. 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). 
107. See id. at 67. 
108. Id. at 68. 
109. 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
110. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
111. Id. at 594. 
112. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735045 (critiquing this aspect of Flook). 
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holding on point of novelty was essentially overruled a few years later in Di-
ehr.113  
Despite its doctrinal problems, the outcome in Flook can be understood as 
consistent with our theory. The inventor claimed a general method of calculat-
ing “alarm limits” in a catalytic conversion process.114 The process, however, 
did not purport to measure temperature, pressure, volume, or any other specific 
aspect of the catalytic conversion process. Thus, the claim was not tied to any 
application whatsoever. Yet the patent applicant wanted to bar all uses of the 
formula in any later application of it. Read this way, the Flook Court merely 
found that the patent applicant was claiming too broadly. The Court’s analysis 
revealed that Flook’s claim far exceeded—and indeed Flook never demonstrat-
ed—any real-world practical application, wholly preempting all present and fu-
ture uses of the alarm-limit algorithm not only in catalytic conversion, but po-
tentially elsewhere. Such a broad claim is properly barred by the abstract ideas 
exception. 
The Court’s rejection of Bilski’s claimed method of hedging is consistent 
with our theory. The patent application in Bilski described a very specific way 
to use historic weather data to determine optimal prices for hedging transac-
tions in particular commodities.115 Yet the first claim sought to patent all such 
hedging transactions, at any price, for any commodity.116 Like the other patent 
applicants outlined here, Bilski claimed too broadly—effectively seeking to 
control the idea of hedging, unmoored to the practical applications the inventor 
actually disclosed.  
We do think this analysis points to a failing in the Court’s Bilski opinion: it 
is too quick to reject each of the other claims. While close analysis may reveal 
that each of Bilski’s narrower claims was still too broad, the Court gave short 
shrift to such considerations. It is possible that Bilski narrowed the dependent 
claims sufficiently to cover only a specific, practical, even novel application. 
Finally, our theory provides the only reasonable explanation of the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in In re Abele,117 which otherwise seems an outlier. In Abele, 
the applicants invented an improvement in digital x-ray data processing that al-
lowed for better imaging while exposing patients to less radiation.118 The in-
vention involved narrowing an x-ray beam in order to reduce exposure, and a 
companion method of calculating the image data to correct for the deficiencies 
caused by a narrower beam.119  
 
113. 450 U.S. at 187. 
114. See In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 22 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
115. See Brief Amici Curiae of 20 Law and Business Professors in Support of Neither 
Party at 31-32, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964). 
116. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24. 
117. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
118. See id. at 903. 
119. See id. at 904. 
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The case involved two claims. Claim 5 covered a “method of displaying 
data” using certain calculations. Claim 6 was the same as claim 5, but limited to 
specific x-ray attenuation data.120 The court rejected the broad claim 5, but 
upheld the narrower claim 6. This result cannot be explained by saying that the 
broad claim did not transform anything, while the narrow claim did. Claim 5 
encompasses—without question—a specific way to process and display an im-
age. If, however, one were to focus on the intangibility of the result it produc-
es—images on a computer screen—then the x-ray related claim must also be an 
abstract idea. Those images are merely a subset of the images claimed in the 
broader claim, and processing x-ray data is no less abstract than processing 
other data. Nor can this result be justified by arguing—as the Federal Circuit 
does in formulating the machine-or-transformation test—that the data in claim 
6 represents “physical” phenomena while the data in claim 5 does not.121 Claim 
5 describes the display of a picture to which the data is related. A picture must 
necessarily be of something physical, so that the data must necessarily be re-
lated to something physical.  
The best, and perhaps only, explanation for this result is that claim 5 was 
simply too broad. While claim 6 is grounded in a particular application with 
practical results relating to x-ray technology, claim 5 is untethered to any spe-
cific application or technology. While the picture of claim 5 was physical in 
some sense, there is no limitation whatsoever on what the picture might be of. 
Thus, the claim effectively covers all uses of the algorithm to improve the im-
age quality of the picture under consideration, foreclosing all present and future 
uses of the algorithm. Like the invalid claims in Morse, Benson, Flook, and Di-
ehr, such broad claims are too abstract. 
In short, we think the overclaiming approach is amply supported in the 
case law. The problem is that courts have not uniformly followed Diehr, nor 
have they explained the abstract ideas doctrine in a consistent and coherent 
way. The result has been that courts fall back on “clues” like the machine-or-
transformation test that, even if based in a theory of overclaiming, disserve that 
goal in practice. 
III. A PROPER APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING CLAIMS THAT IMPERMISSIBLY 
COVER ABSTRACT IDEAS 
Focusing on claim scope provides a principled way to determine whether a 
particular claim, rather than a particular subject matter, is unpatentable. Specif-
ically, our approach focuses on the application of the idea to determine the 
proper level of abstraction that merits protection. As claims become broader—
and necessarily more general and abstract—they become more indefinite and 
difficult to understand, and more likely to ensnare future inventions embodying 
 
120. See id. at 908. 
121. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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the inventive principle. At their limit, they claim everything and contribute 
nothing. The practical effect of allowing such breadth is to make later im-
provements more costly or even impossible.  
To be sure, identifying overclaiming is not straightforward, and no test will 
yield conclusive answers. Yet we believe some tests are clearly more worka-
ble—and better further the policy-based goals of § 101—than others. This Part 
discusses why the machine-or-transformation test is unsuitable, and then pro-
vides a better way to identify improper claims. 
A. The Failure of the Machine-or-Transformation Test 
As discussed in Part I, continued reliance on the machine-or-transformation 
test is problematic because that test has little to do with claim scope. For exam-
ple, it fails to identify why the claims in Benson and Flook should be unpatent-
able when both are unambiguously performed by a machine. To be sure, the 
insignificant postsolution activity test provides an exception to the rule, but 
every software patent will be executed on a machine. If every such claim is re-
viewed for “insignificant” activity, the exception becomes the rule without any 
definition of what “insignificance” is. 
A focus on physicality fares no better. For instance, the Federal Circuit 
held in Prometheus that the claimed medical diagnostic test sufficiently trans-
formed matter, because “[t]he transformation is of the human body following 
administration of a drug.”122 Chemical transformations that occur within the 
body, however, could just as plausibly be characterized as “insignificant extra-
solution activity,” because they simply relate to a mere “data-gathering step”123 
that is tangential to the process performed directly by the diagnostic test. The 
court’s conclusory reasoning about transformation does not answer the ques-
tion; as Abele shows, a method may transform data about physical subject mat-
ter but still be too broad.  
The problem is that the machine-or-transformation test simply asks the 
wrong question. For example, in Comiskey, the arbitration process was unpa-
tentable not because it lacked a computer, but because the claim embraced 
countless arbitration arrangements untied to any practical application of their 
idea. The application claimed too much.  
This is likely to be a recurring problem in software cases in particular. The 
genius of computer technology is that it is a platform that allows creation to oc-
cur on it. A computer program can be claimed in terms specific or general, but 
today (except by happenstance) it would rarely be logically limited to running 
on a particular type of hardware. Requiring that software claims be tied to par-
ticular machines would indeed impose a limitation on their scope, but the limi-
 
122. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).  
123. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. 
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tation would bear no relationship to what the patentee actually invented. The 
first programmer to build a dynamic linked list shouldn’t own the concept, and 
it doesn’t help to say that he owns the concept when implemented on a Dell 
computer but not a Mac. Limiting the scope of a patent claim makes sense only 
if the limitation bears some relationship to the inventive aspect of the claimed 
invention. In software patents, hardware is almost never the inventive aspect. 
Machines and transformations may be relevant to this inquiry, but only as a 
way to conceptualize whether a claim is overbroad. Treating machine-or-
transformation as a proxy or other subpart of a gatekeeping test is ill-advised. 
B. Identifying Abstract Ideas 
Claims are proper when the scope of the patentee’s claims is commensu-
rate with a practical, real world contribution the patentee has made. They are 
too broad when they assert coverage over general ideas unmoored to any spe-
cific use, and therefore deprive subsequent researchers of access to those ideas. 
Make no mistake—determining whether claims are abstract must be performed 
case by case. Even so, courts and litigants need not be entirely at sea. We have 
rules (and standards) that guide us in determining whether a claim is enabled, 
novel, and so forth. Here, too, we have a baseline requirement: that the claim be 
tied to a practical, applied contribution of the inventor. The factors that follow 
are tools to answer this question, but the question itself is one that can have a 
principled answer. 
One factor that courts should consider is the generative nature of the new 
technology. Is the claimed invention one with a very limited set of possible ap-
plications? If so, we might not worry about locking up future avenues of re-
search. Patent claims to inventions that are ends in themselves, rather than 
means to new ends, are less likely to create § 101 overbreadth problems. The 
Benson Court worried that the patentee would lock up the principle of binary-
coded-decimal conversion. But the more specific a mathematical algorithm 
gets, the less likely it is to be useful outside the context of the patented inven-
tion. If Windows 7 is a mathematical algorithm (and in one sense, it is), it is not 
one we need worry much about preventing others from using for different ends. 
By contrast, the newer a field, and the more likely it is to have a variety of ap-
plications, the more reluctant we should be to award ownership of generative 
building blocks to people who have not yet explored how they may be applied.  
Second, the nature of the industry in which the invention occurs may be re-
levant. While all inventors depend to some extent on the work of others, some 
industries are more likely to rely on cumulative innovation than others, and the 
danger of allowing patents on abstract claims is correspondingly greater in 
those industries. We think that explains why we have seen abstract idea cases 
almost exclusively in the electronic and computer arts, rather than in, say, the 
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pharmaceutical industry.124 That is not to say a patentee could never overclaim 
in a mechanical art. Imagine, for instance, the inventor of the first catheter 
claiming “any means, however developed, for noninvasive surgical intervention 
in the human body.” But the damage that such broad claims can do will be 
greater in industries that rely more heavily on cumulative innovation.125 
Third, on a related note, industries differ in the speed with which advances 
are made. Because patents expire after twenty years, the cost of an overbroad 
patent claim may be less in a slow-moving field than in one that changes quick-
ly. The Morse Court was prescient to suggest that eventually someone might 
happen upon other means than the telegraph of using electromagnetism to 
communicate at a distance, but as it happened, Morse’s patent claims would 
have expired by the time the first of those new technologies was developed. But 
that will not always be the case, and in newer and faster-changing industries the 
risk of stifling after-arising technology is greater. 
Fourth, courts should be particularly wary of general claims to a principle 
based on one or very few specific applications. When a patentee identifies only 
one specific application, but claims a very broad principle, it is more likely that 
the broader claim will encompass unanticipated applications. This situation in-
creases the likelihood that others will need access to the claimed principle, 
access that might be denied or limited to the public’s detriment. To be sure, 
written description and enablement analysis under § 112 also examines such 
concerns; claims that are not described and enabled are also more likely to be 
abstract. When applied to abstract ideas, however, this factor can extend 
beyond § 112. Because § 101 is not tied to the filing date of the application, 
courts can consider potential (even hypothetical) technologies that might tech-
nically be enabled, but that are not supported by the application presented by 
the inventor. Further, § 112 sometimes permits patentees to claim a genus by 
relying on only a single example. While one example may enable one of skill in 
the art to practice a range of alternatives, § 101 might still impose limits on the 
resulting claim. 
Fifth, courts should consider the importance of the patentee’s contribution. 
Strictly speaking, importance has no bearing on how abstract the patentee’s 
claims are, but as we indicated earlier, overclaiming is about balancing the in-
centives needed for the patentee against the risk of stifling future innovation. 
Truly groundbreaking patents may require broader protection for the simple 
reason that an inventor who opens up a new field may have less idea how her 
invention will be used by others. We can’t effectively assess that balance unless 
we have some sense of how important the patentee’s invention is, as well as 
 
124. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 142-66 (2009) (identifying abstract ideas doctrine as a policy lever 
that is likely to be more important in some industries than others). 
125. The authors are not of one mind as to whether (and how much) courts should ex-
pressly consider the industry in deciding abstractness, but there is little question that abstract 
ideas claims will be more common in certain industries. 
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how important the future innovation might be. An old doctrine once held that 
“pioneering” patents were to be given broad scope.126 That doctrine is now mo-
ribund, brought down by the singular focus on patent claim language to define 
an invention’s scope. Yet the idea of pioneering patents might usefully be ap-
plied in this different context to give greater leeway to those who arguably 
teach more. The more important the patentee’s contribution, the more we 
should err on the side of allowing broad claims at the margins.127  
In sum, we believe at least five factors are critical to a proper scope-based 
determination for patentable subject matter eligibility under § 101: 
• Is the claimed invention potentially generative of many kinds of new  
     inventions? 
• Does the industry rely heavily on cumulative invention? 
• Is the technological field fast-moving? 
• Has the patentee disclosed a small number of embodiments but claimed  
     a broad inventive principle? 
• Has the patentee made an important contribution relative to the prior  
     art? 
No one factor should dominate; we advocate a contextual, common-law 
approach. Courts and scholars are likely to develop other factors as our ap-
proach is applied over time. 
C. Overclaiming and the Decision Process 
Finally, thinking about § 101 and the abstract ideas doctrine as scope limi-
tations may help change the way we approach subject matter procedurally. The 
“gatekeeper” theory carries with it the logical consequence that § 101 eligibility 
should be decided first. After all, if your invention isn’t eligible for patenting at 
all, we don’t need to figure out whether it’s new and nonobvious and whether 
you have taught people how to make and use it. And so the Federal Circuit in 
 
126. See, e.g., Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 207 (1894) (“If the invention is 
broad or primary in its character, the range of equivalents will be correspondingly broad, un-
der the liberal construction which the courts give to such inventions.”); Perkin-Elmer Corp. 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A pioneer invention is 
entitled to a broad range of equivalents.”); John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Pa-
tent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 37 (1995) (“Courts construe pio-
neer patent claims . . . to encompass a broader range of so-called ‘equivalents’ during an in-
fringement determination.”). 
127. See Kokomo Fence Mach. Co. v. Kitselman, 189 U.S. 8, 18-19 (1903) (“In view of 
what passed in the Patent Office, and the state of the art, we cannot regard the Kitselman pa-
tent as a pioneer patent, but think its claims must be limited in their scope to the actual com-
bination of essential parts as shown . . . .”). 
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Comiskey strongly suggested, if not required, that § 101 be decided before eve-
rything else.128 
That is a mistake. There were many, many ways to reject Bilski’s claim 1. 
As a result, both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court approached the 
case with the preconception that Bilski should lose, and looked to the only 
available doctrine allowed by the procedural posture—§ 101—to make sure 
that he did.129 And so neither court was too careful about the doctrine it created 
or how it applied that doctrine, because the result in that case was foreordained. 
We think a subject-matter-first approach is backwards. Our claim-
overbreadth approach requires careful attention to what the patentee invented, 
what came before, and what might come after. It can’t logically be applied in 
advance of thinking about the other issues in a patent case. Indeed, we agree 
with a number of commentators that the right time to apply § 101 is as a back-
stop after all other validity doctrines have been exhausted.130 We don’t need 
the abstract ideas doctrine to weed out claims like Bilski’s claim 1. Only once 
an invention is deemed new, nonobvious, described, and enabled should we ask 
whether there is nonetheless some reason to limit a claim. Asking the question 
later is likely both to produce a clearer answer—courts will have to think care-
fully about why they are rejecting such a claim—and to reduce the risk that we 
inappropriately carve entire areas of invention out of the patent system. 
D. Applying the Scope-Based Patentable Subject Matter Analysis 
We now apply our theory and factors to a variety of controversial claims. 
Of course, the evidence relating to these claims may differ from what we see in 
reported opinions; as such, reasonable minds can differ based on varying un-
derstandings of the factors involved. 
We first address the PTO’s request for examples of what might or might 
not constitute abstract ideas. While we believe that this Article might offer the 
PTO guidance, provision of specific examples would be fruitless. Indeed, that 
is the point of an overclaiming approach rather than a gatekeeper approach. We 
cannot know whether a particular claim is too abstract until we understand the 
inventive principles, prior art, industries, and potential downstream inventions. 
Of course, we can hypothesize, as we did with our example of the catheter in-
ventor claiming “all noninvasive surgery,” but such absurd claims are rare, 
 
128. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). But see In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d at 950-51 n.1 (stating that Comiskey did not require patentable subject matter to be 
examined first).  
129. Cf. Michael Risch, The Idea’s the Thing, LEGAL TIMES, May 12, 2008, available at 
http://law.wvu.edu/r/download/9874 (expressing concern that the weakness of Bilski’s appli-
cation would cause courts to create over-restrictive subject matter rules). 
130. See, e.g., Christopher T. Abernethy, Cruel Hand of Bilski: Culminating the Short-
sighted Crusade for Marginalization of the ‘Process’ Patent 27-37 (May 2009) (unpublished 
comment), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420205. 
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and—like Bilski’s—are almost always invalid for many reasons unrelated to 
their abstractness. We thus focus on some closer cases. 
One such case is Metabolite,131 in which the patentee claimed a method for 
diagnosing a vitamin deficiency by measuring total homocysteine in the blood 
and correlating elevated levels with a deficiency.132 Three Justices argued that 
this claim was an unpatentable natural phenomenon.133 While some agree, oth-
ers criticize this view because every medical diagnostic method (and most 
every treatment method) boils down to a natural phenomenon.134  
Our analysis would instead focus on whether the claim is an application of 
the natural phenomena or whether it is so broad as to be unmoored from any 
specific application. It is difficult to dispute that the use of the relationship be-
tween total homocysteine and vitamin levels to diagnose a deficiency is applied 
in some sense, because it is implemented in a specific test that compares the 
relationship between two substances in the body. At the same time, the claim is 
broad, because any homocysteine test—including tests not yet invented—will 
infringe if it is used to diagnose the deficiency. 
The question becomes whether the claim is overbroad in the § 101 sense. 
Importantly, the claim does not preclude follow-on invention of new kinds of 
general diagnostic tests that measure the relationship between any and all sub-
stances in the body. Rather, the Metabolite test diagnoses a particular vitamin 
deficiency. Further, it uses one particular blood test—total homocysteines—not 
every blood test. Others are free to develop new blood measurements and new 
ways to test for this particular deficiency, even if they cannot use the particular 
method disclosed in the patent. And the claim does not cover other possible 
uses of the relationship, such as medical interventions that aim at reducing total 
homocysteine. Applying some of our factors, the technology was not generative 
and the industry is not particularly speedy, so the risk of locking up further im-
provements to this specific test seems low. Further, the claim appears to be tied 
to the disclosed embodiment because the inventors described the principles at 
work and the failures of other tests. In short, we find it unlikely that future in-
ventors were blocked from creating new diagnostic tests in general, or even 
new ways to diagnose this particular deficiency. The primary concern, instead, 
was that downstream users would have to pay to exploit the discovery of the 
inventors, but that potential comes with every patent; there is no guarantee any 
downstream user will be able to invent around any particular patent claim. 
 
131. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006). 
Disclosure: Author Mark A. Lemley represented the patentee in this case. 
132. See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006). 
133. See Metabolite Labs., 126 S. Ct. at 2922, 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
134. See Risch, supra note 61, at 600 (“Everything that happens may be deemed the 
work of nature . . . .” (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 
134-35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
LEMLEY-63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2011 1:10 PM 
1344 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1315 
Another medical diagnostic test example is Prometheus,135 in which the 
patentee claimed a method for adjusting medication for any given patient by 
measuring how much of the medicine’s metabolites appear in that patient’s 
body.136 The district court invalidated the patent because the amount of meta-
bolization by any given patient was a natural phenomenon.137 The Federal Cir-
cuit reversed, holding (both before and again after Bilski) that because the drug 
was transformed in the human body—and indeed transformed the body itself—
the patent satisfied the machine-or-transformation test.138 Neither of these rul-
ings is particularly helpful from an abstract ideas standpoint. The district 
court’s focus was misplaced because there was nothing natural about the drug’s 
effect on the body—it was an artificial drug and no human would ever react to 
it in nature.139  
The Federal Circuit’s analysis, by contrast, would allow too much. A pa-
tent claim can transform something and still be overbroad. If, for example, the 
patentee claimed all correlations of every drug in the body, the claim would 
certainly be abstract but would still pass the Federal Circuit’s test. Our ap-
proach provides a way out of the thicket. Here, the claim was to very specific 
measurements of a particular drug. Like Metabolite, Prometheus involves an 
application of the natural principles discovered by the patentee. It is not genera-
tive, nor will it unduly bar future inventors. If, however, this claim were ex-
panded to cover all drugs without any specific measurements, then it would be 
an abstract idea. 
Metabolite and Prometheus concern inventions in the biotech and medical 
fields. Another field worthy of discussion is computer software. As we men-
tioned earlier, in Benson, the Supreme Court found a claimed algorithm used to 
convert data on a computer from one format to another was too broad, because 
it was not moored to any specific practical application. As such, it unduly pre-
vented follow-on invention because it wholly preempted all use of the algo-
rithm in any application whatsoever.  
As we also noted, however, the Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences 
has out-of-hand rejected software claims under the machine-or-transformation 
test that require a more rigorous analysis under our proposed test. For instance, 
in Ex parte Heuer, the Board rejected a claim to a method for decoding a binary 
 
135. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (granting 
certiorari, vacating underlying judgment, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Bils-
ki). 
136. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543. 
137. See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25062 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d, 581 F.3d 1336, vacated and remanded, 
130 S. Ct. 3543. 
138. See Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1345-46; see also Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (on remand). 
139. See Brief of Amici Curiae Interested Patent Law Professors in Support of Neither 
Party at 1, Prometheus, 581 F.3d 1336 (No. 2008-1403). 
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representation of a document, finding that nothing in the specification required 
any “hardware” and therefore no machine was claimed under the machine-or-
transformation test.140 Under an appropriate § 101 scope analysis, the relevant 
concern is not whether there is a physical machine per se in the specification or 
claim language. Rather, the question should be whether the claim is so abstract 
and sweeping as to preclude all uses of the inventive idea, or whether it is suffi-
ciently applied.  
The proposed claim in Heuer is similar to that of Benson in that it concerns 
a method for converting a set of data from one format to another. Unlike the 
algorithm in Benson, however, the claim in Heuer does not cover a general al-
gorithm, but instead a method of converting an XML-document that comprises 
particular steps. This factor weighs heavily in favor of patentability. On the 
other hand, those steps are relatively broad and cover implementations on any 
type of machine using any kind of XML data, including those not yet in-
vented—indeed, the claim is not even limited to a general-purpose computer. 
Because the software industry is rapidly changing, under our proposed test one 
might argue that the claim should be moored to a specific type of computer or 
data structure to pass muster. Yet such an insistence would in essence require 
all software claims to be limited to those types of computers in use today. This 
kind of approach would unquestionably limit the value of software patents, and 
in a way that is unnecessary to adequately protect follow-on invention. Instead, 
a better way to cabin the broad scope of software patents is, in addition to de-
termining whether the claim itself essentially covers merely the abstract idea at 
issue, to examine the contribution of the inventor relative to the prior art.  
As we noted earlier, this examination is distinct from a § 112 analysis. Al-
though an inventor will often meet the written description and enablement 
standards by merely disclosing a few examples, for claims that could signifi-
cantly impede follow-on invention (such as Heuer’s) a more searching review 
may be advisable. Here, the question becomes whether Heuer disclosed suffi-
cient embodiments to justify the relatively broad language in his proposed 
claim. In other words, does the disclosure justify the scope of preclusion of po-
tential follow-on inventions embodying the general method claimed? This 
analysis will turn on the views of experts and others skilled in the relevant art, 
and thus, we cannot answer the § 101 scope question at issue in Heuer here. In-
deed, because this sort of analysis will not always be straightforward, we sug-
gest that it be done last in any given case, after a review for novelty, nonob-
viousness, utility, and § 112 disclosure requirements. 
Another difficult case under our test arises in the context of sports moves— 
such as patenting a new type of curveball. In some sense, a pitcher throwing a 
curveball might be argued to pass the machine-or-transformation test in the 
sense that the pitcher’s body and the ball’s location, velocity, and spin are 
 
140. See Ex parte Heuer, No. 2009-004590, 2010 WL 3072973, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 
2010). 
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transformed.141 The common intuition, however, is that this sort of claim 
should not be patentable subject matter, either because it does not concern 
technology or is too far afield from what is typically patentable. Apparently for 
this reason, the proposed PTO guidelines categorically classify “human beha-
vior,” particularly “exercising,” as an example of a “general concept” that 
weighs against patent eligibility. Yet some human behavior—indeed, even 
some forms of exercise—should be eligible subject matter. Consider, for exam-
ple, a novel method of exercising that helps relieve knee pain. Under the ma-
chine-or-transformation test, it is difficult to distinguish new exercise that is de-
signed to cure a malady from one that merely increases the number of stri-
strikeouts.  
However, under our proposed test—whether the claim is moored to specif-
ic, practical application—these distinctions are not as arbitrary. In particular, a 
novel exercise that helps cure knee pain would be a specific, practical applica-
tion of the inventive ideas underlying the exercise. And this application would 
generally not foreclose other inventors from devising some new exercise to 
cure knee pain.  
So too with a novel method of throwing a particular kind of curveball. A 
new motion that leads to a particular practical result with a baseball should 
probably be patentable. Arguably, patenting would not prevent follow-on in-
vention if the claims were narrow. If, however, the claim were to every method 
of controlling ball motion using spin, then the claim would be more generative 
and likely too abstract. Pitching doesn’t change rapidly. Nor is the claim not 
applied—this seems a very specific application of the general inventive prin-
ciple. This is not to say that a new curveball is otherwise patentable—it may be 
obvious, it may not have operable utility, or it may not be definite. It is, howev-
er, allowable subject matter.142 
 CONCLUSION 
The abstract ideas limitation on patentable subject matter has long been a 
puzzle, one Bilski did little to resolve. We think the dominant conception of 
§ 101 as a gatekeeper, excluding certain inventions from the patent system al-
together, is wrong. We don’t exclude inventions from patentability because the 
invention is too abstract. We refuse to patent certain claims when those claims 
reach too broadly and thereby threaten downstream innovation. Reconceiving 
abstract ideas as a scope limitation not only helps to explain the case law, but it 
 
141. See Magliocca, supra note 52, at 876 n.7. 
142. There may, of course, be “fairness” concerns in the game that counsel in favor of 
allowing pitchers to freely throw a new type of curveball, but such issues are best handled by 
league rules and not by courts determining what should be patentable. See Risch, supra note 
61, at 645. 
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avoids the disastrous consequences associated with the machine-or-
transformation test. 
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In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court declined calls to categorically ex-
clude business methods—or any technology—from the patent law. It also rejected 
as the sole test of subject matter eligibility the Federal Circuit’s deeply-flawed 
machine-or-transformation test, under which no process is patentable unless it is 
tied to a particular machine or transforms an article to another state or thing. 
Subsequent developments threaten to undo that holding, however. Relying on the 
Court’s description of the Federal Circuit test as a “useful and important clue,” 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, patent litigants, and district courts have 
all continued to rely on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake of Bilski: 
no longer as the sole rule, but as a presumptive starting point that threatens to ef-
fectively become mandatory. In this Article, we suggest a new way to understand 
the exclusion of abstract ideas from patentable subject matter. No class of inven-
tion is inherently too abstract for patenting. Rather, the rule against patenting 
abstract ideas is an effort to prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too 
broadly. By requiring that patent claims be limited to a specific set of practical 
applications of an idea, the abstract ideas doctrine both makes the scope of the 
resulting patent clearer and leaves room for subsequent inventors to improve 
upon—and patent new applications of—the same basic principle. Recasting the 
abstract ideas doctrine as an overclaiming test eliminates the constraints of the 
artificial machine-or-transformation test, as well as the pointless effort to fit in-
ventions into permissible or impermissible categories. It also helps understand 
some otherwise-inexplicable distinctions in the case law. Testing for overclaim-
ing allows courts to focus on what really matters: whether the scope of the paten-
tee’s claims are commensurate with the invention’s practical, real-world contri-
bution. This inquiry, we suggest, is the touchstone of the abstract ideas analysis, 
and the way out of the post-Bilski confusion.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court rejected calls to categorically ex-
clude business methods—or any technology—from the scope of patent law.1 It 
also rejected as the sole test of subject matter eligibility the Federal Circuit’s 
deeply-flawed machine-or-transformation test, under which no process, and 
perhaps no invention of any type, is patentable unless it is tied to a particular 
machine or transforms an article to another state or thing.2 Nonetheless, the 
Court held that the machine-or-transformation test still “is a useful and impor-
tant clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inven-
tions” are patentable subject matter.3 The result was a (narrow) victory for in-
ventors, as well as for context-specific standards over formal rules. 
Subsequent developments threaten to undo that win, however. Relying on 
the Court’s “useful and important clue” language, the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO), patent litigants, and district courts have all continued to re-
ly on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake of Bilski: no longer as the 
sole rule, but as a presumptive starting point that threatens to become effective-
ly mandatory. Put simply, the problem is that no one understands what makes 
an idea “abstract,”4 and hence ineligible for patent protection, so decisionmak-
ers fall back on the one test that has been articulated.  
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 2. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 3. 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
 4. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process 
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010) (providing an ex-
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In this Article, we suggest a new way to understand the exclusion of ab-
stract ideas from patentable subject matter. No class of invention is inherently 
too abstract for patenting. Rather, the rule against patenting abstract ideas is 
best understood as an effort to prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too 
broadly. By requiring that patent claims be limited to a specific set of practical 
applications of an idea, the abstract ideas doctrine both makes the scope of the 
resulting patent clearer and leaves room for subsequent inventors to improve 
upon—and patent new applications of—the same basic principle. 
Understanding the abstract ideas doctrine as an overclaiming test elimi-
nates the constraints of the artificial machine-or-transformation rule, as well as 
the pointless effort to fit inventions into permissible and impermissible catego-
ries. It also helps understand some otherwise-inexplicable distinctions in the 
case law. A focus on overclaiming allows courts to focus on what really mat-
ters: whether the scope of the patentee’s claims is commensurate with the in-
vention’s practical, real-world contribution, rather than asserting coverage over 
general ideas unmoored to a specific application. This inquiry, we suggest, is 
the touchstone of the abstract ideas analysis, and the way out of the post-Bilski 
confusion.  
 In Part I, we discuss the rise, fall, and apparent rebirth of the Federal 
Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test, and explain why it is so problematic. 
In Part II, we offer a new way of thinking about abstract ideas, one focused on 
the scope of the patentee’s claims rather than the category of the invention. In 
Part III, we apply our test to a variety of current cases and problems. 
I. THE RETURN OF MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION  
A. The History of Patenting Software 
The patentability of software and business methods has a long and tortured 
history. Put extremely briefly: The Supreme Court in the 1970s struggled with 
mathematical algorithm and software patents, first refusing to patent a mathe-
matical algorithm,5 but later holding that a process could be patented even 
though its novel elements included software so long as that software was tied to 
a particular machine.6 After these cases, the Supreme Court got out of the busi-
ness of patentable subject matter for nearly thirty years.7 
 
planation of considerations to use in determining subject matter eligibility of method claims 
in view of the abstract idea exception). 
 5. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 65, 71-72 (1972).  
 6. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 191-93 (1981) (“On the other hand, 
when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a 
structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the 
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different 
state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101 . . . . [W]e do not view res-
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Through the 1980s and 1990s, courts gradually eroded the requirement that 
a software invention be tied to a particular machine.8 Finally, in 1998, in State 
Street, the Federal Circuit eliminated any such requirement, holding that both 
software alone and business methods were patentable regardless of the form in 
which they were implemented, if the invention produced a “useful, concrete, 
and tangible result,” even one expressed in numbers.9 
For a decade after 1998, patentable subject matter was effectively a dead 
letter. That changed dramatically in 2008 when the Federal Circuit decided In 
re Bilski en banc. The case involved a patent application on a method of hedg-
ing risk in the sale of commodities. The patent application also included depen-
dent claims that limit the method to use in the energy industry and one depen-
dent claim that offers a formula for calculating risk-adjusted prices. The Feder-
Federal Circuit ruled, eleven to one, that Bilski’s claimed method of hedging 
financial risk was unpatentable.10 
The Federal Circuit crafted what has come to be known as the machine-or-
transformation test: “A claimed process is . . . patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) 
it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular 
article into a different state or thing.”11  
Moreover, even if a process meets this test, it is unpatentable if the ma-
chine or transformation is merely incidental extra-solution activity.12 And an 
invention that preempts all use of a law of nature or algorithm, even in a partic-
ular field of use, is not patentable even if it would otherwise survive the test. 
Purporting to derive this test from Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Cir-
cuit displaced all prior tests for patentable subject matter, including State 
Street’s “useful, concrete, and tangible result” analysis.13 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed that Bilski’s invention 
was unpatentable as an abstract idea.14 However, the Court rejected the ma-
chine-or-transformation analysis as the exclusive test of patentability,15 though 
 
pondents’ claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to 
an industrial process for the molding of rubber products . . . .”). 
 7. The one exception—J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 
124 (2001)—involved the interaction of the patent statute with other specialized statutes pro-
tecting plants. 
 8. For a discussion of this history, see Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 9. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). While there were three dis-
sents, only Judge Pauline Newman would have found the claims to be patentable subject 
matter. 
 11. Id. at 954. 
 12. See id. at 957. 
 13. Id. at 959-61. 
 14. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229-30 (2010). 
 15. See id. at 3227. 
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all the Justices thought that the test was an “important clue” to patentability.16 
Alas, the Court’s majority did not provide additional guidance on why Bilski’s 
invention was unpatentable.17  
B. The Persistence of the Machine-or-Transformation Test 
Patent owners narrowly dodged a bullet in Bilski. No one except perhaps 
Bilski himself thought that he would get a patent.18 However, four Justices 
would have held business methods unpatentable altogether,19 and in the course 
of doing so would have substantially limited patentable subject matter. Thus, 
the fact that Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court rejected strict application 
of the machine-or-transformation test and left open the prospect of patenting 
software and business methods led early commentators to declare it a victory 
for patent owners in those industries.20 
In fact, the PTO and the few district courts to have decided cases since 
Bilski have continued to apply the machine-or-transformation test. For exam-
ple, in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, the claims related to the process of 
displaying copyrighted media in exchange for watching certain advertising.21 
The district court held that “even though the machine or transformation is no 
longer the litmus test for patentability, the Court will use it here as a key indica-
tor of patentability.”22  
The PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) has similarly 
focused on the machine-or-transformation test in analyzing post-Bilski 
claims.23 In Ex parte Tse-Huong Choo, the BPAI rejected a claim that it found 
“can exist solely in software and data structures.”24 More importantly, the 
 
 16. Id. at 3227; id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 3258 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 17. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Waiting for Bilski: A Patent Story 5 (July 12, 2010) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1650061 (“In the end, [Bilski] tells Bar and Academy nothing more than has already been 
said. The men remain in the same fog of confusion.”). 
 18. In fact, the Bilski patent had a co-inventor, Rand Warsaw. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3218. However, for simplicity, we assume in the text that Bilski was the sole inventor. 
 19. See id. at 3249 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Indeed, many believe that 
the concurrence was originally to be the majority opinion. 
 20. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No 
Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to 
Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289 (2011). 
 21. See No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx), 2010 WL 3360098, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 
2010). 
 22. Id. at *3. 
 23. For a full discussion of all board opinions since Bilski, see Dave Healey, BPAI: 
Tough on Software Claims Post-Bilski, PAT. MATH (Dec. 7, 2010), http://patentmath.com/ 
bpai-tough-on-software-claims-post-bilski.  
 24. No. 2009-006352, 2010 WL 2985362, at *2 (B.P.A.I. July 28, 2010). 
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Board looked at a Beauregard claim25 and found that “merely reciting data or 
instructions on a stored computer readable medium does not make a claim sta-
tutory [subject matter] under § 101. Similarly, merely placing instructions or 
code on a computer readable medium does not render claim 24 statutory.”26 
Thus, the Board concluded that Bilski bars not just process but also article-of-
manufacture claims to software standing alone.27  
The Board has been equally strict in applying the transformation step of the 
machine-or-transformation test to software. In Ex parte Heuer, the Board re-
jected a claim to a method for decoding a binary representation of a docu-
ment.28 The BPAI found that the claims failed both prongs of the machine-or-
transformation test. It specifically looked at an “XML-based document,” “a 
simplified schema,” “a schema,” “correction code,” and “at least one decoder” 
and found that nothing in the specification indicating that they “must be hard-
ware” and that there was therefore no machine.29 On the transformation side, 
the BPAI found that “[t]he fact that Appellants’ XML-based document is de-
coded using the claimed ‘namespace’ or the claimed ‘simplified schema’ fails 
to qualify as a transformation of an article of manufacture consistent with the 
second prong of the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test.”30 The latter ruling 
seems to be more restrictive than the Federal Circuit decision in In re Bilski, 
since it doesn’t permit transformation of anything other than an article of manu-
facture, while the Federal Circuit had appeared willing in Bilski to allow some 
transformations of data to meet the machine-or-transformation test.31 
The PTO issued guidance in interpreting Bilski in July 2010, identifying 
various factors that could affect patentable subject matter eligibility; all of 
 
 25. Beauregard claims are directed to software stored on a medium such as a CD-
ROM claimed as an article of manufacture. See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
 26. Tse-Huong Choo, 2010 WL 2985362, at *5 (citations omitted); accord Ex parte 
Kelkar, No. 2009-004635, 2010 WL 3768175 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010). 
 27. See also Ex parte Christian, No. 2009-006589, 2010 WL 3389297, at *2 (B.P.A.I. 
Aug. 23, 2010) (“A claim that recites no more than software, logic, or a data structure (i.e. an 
abstraction) does not fall within any statutory category. . . . ‘Abstract software code is an 
idea without physical embodiment.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449 (2007))); Ex parte Ramanujam, No. 2009-002483, 2010 WL 
3214559, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 12, 2010) (finding that claims “are therefore directed to soft-
ware per se, which falls outside the scope of patentable subject matter”); Ex parte Caccavale, 
No. 2009-006026, 2010 WL 2901727, at *5 (B.P.A.I. July 23, 2010) (“Claim 8 simply fails 
to recite that the computations are performed by the ‘distributed processing units’ or any 
other machine in claim 8.”). Contra Ex parte Russo, No. 2009-001876, 2010 WL 3441058 
(B.P.A.I. Aug. 30, 2010) (holding a system claim directed to data structures unpatentable, 
but a Beauregard claim to the same data structures patentable). 
 28. No. 2009-004590, 2010 WL 3072973 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 2010); accord Ex parte 
Venkata, No. 2009-007302 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 5, 2010); Ex parte MacKenzie, No. 2009-007332 
(B.P.A.I. Oct. 4, 2010). 
 29. Heuer, 2010 WL 3072973, at *8. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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those factors relate generally to the machine-or-transformation test or are im-
plementations of it.32 We have heard reports that patent examiners are more le-
nient than the Board generally has been, allowing claims to general-purpose 
computers programmed with software and rejecting only pure software 
claims.33 But by the nature of the appellate process, it is the Board decisions 
that are likely to shape the law in future cases.  
In December 2010, the Federal Circuit decided Research Corp. Technolo-
gies v. Microsoft Corp., holding that software method claims directed to a 
process of “halftoning” printed images were not unpatentable abstract ideas be-
cause the invention “presents functional and palpable applications in the field 
of computer technology.”34 The opinion noted that other (unasserted) claims in 
the patent required the use of specific machines, demanded evidence that the 
claim be “manifestly abstract” before holding it invalid, and went so far as to 
suggest that “inventions with specific applications or improvements to technol-
ogies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract” as to fail § 101.35 The 
court did not apply the machine-or-transformation test, and indeed suggested 
(wrongly) that the Supreme Court had rejected that test as nonstatutory.36 The 
court suggested that § 112 may better serve the goal of limiting overbroad 
claim language.37  
Research Corp. is an encouraging sign that the machine-or-transformation 
test may not dominate the post-Bilski landscape. Indeed, it might suggest a re-
turn to the State Street form of analysis. But some caution is warranted. The 
case was written by Judge Rader, and joined by Judge Newman, the two judges 
who dissented from the machine-or-transformation test in In re Bilski. It con-
tains some specious reasoning that is hard to square with prior court precedent, 
such as its conclusion that structural limitations in dependent claims render pa-
tentable different, independent claims that lack those limitations.38 And it does 
 
 32. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject-Matter Eligibility for Process 
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010). 
 33. One Board opinion supports this more lenient approach. See Ex parte Ulf, No. 
2009-008071, 2010 WL 3611779, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 7, 2010) (“Dependent claim 4 expli-
citly recites ‘an inquiry, made on an opportunity reservation computer database.’ In particu-
lar, since a computer is required to query a computer database, we find evidence that the me-
thod steps of dependent claim 4 are implemented on a ‘machine.’ Therefore, claim 4 is tied 
to a ‘machine’ consistent with the bounds of the machine-or-transformation test.”). But see 
Ex parte Aklilu, No. 2009-007075, 2010 WL 4315178, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 29, 2010) 
(“[M]ere use of a generic machine or a general purpose computer to perform the steps of an 
otherwise unpatentable algorithm is not sufficient to meet the requirements for § 101 statuto-
ry subject matter.”). 
 34. 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 35. Id. at 869. 
 36. See id. at 868. 
 37. See id. at 869. 
 38. See id. (“The fact that some claims in the ’310 and ’228 patents require a ‘high 
contrast film,’ ‘a film printer,’ ‘a memory,’ and ‘printer and display devices’ also confirm 
[sic] this court’s holding that the invention is not abstract.”). 
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not offer a detailed test of its own, instead simply holding that the claims at is-
sue are not abstract (albeit with some discussion). Given that the Federal Cir-
cuit created the machine-or-transformation test, it seems quite possible that the 
majority of the court will incline to the views of the BPAI and the district 
courts that the machine-or-transformation test continues to govern in most in-
stances, distinguishing Research Corp. on its facts. 
Indeed, some reason to think that likely came just over a week later, in 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services.39 The court 
there reaffirmed the patentability of a method for optimizing drug dosages dur-
ing therapy. But in doing so, the Federal Circuit held that the Supreme Court 
“did not disavow the machine-or-transformation test” and had instead indicated 
“that ‘[t]ransformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing 
is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular 
machines.’”40 The contradictory statements of the Federal Circuit in Research 
Corp. and Prometheus suggest that the role of the machine-or-transformation 
test will be at least subject to ongoing debate. 
C. The Perils of the Machine-or-Transformation Test 
The machine-or-transformation test is problematic. It contains a number of 
ambiguities, leads to some bizarre results, and poorly tracks the stated goal of 
preventing the patenting of abstract ideas. 
First the ambiguities. Does the machine-or-transformation test apply only 
to process claims? The prior Supreme Court cases in Benson, Flook, and Diehr 
were all process claims.41 The Federal Circuit decision in In re Bilski distin-
guishes In re Nuijten as directed to an article of manufacture, not a process,42 
but does not do the same for In re Alappat, an en banc decision holding that a 
new computer program automatically makes a general-purpose computer “a 
new machine.”43 The BPAI and the district courts have generally held that the 
machine-or-transformation test is not limited to process claims. And there is no 
logical reason to cabin the holding to process claims; Benson and Diehr were 
process claims, but the Court’s analysis did not focus on that fact. If the ma-
chine-or-transformation test were limited to process claims, it would generally 
 
 39. 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 40. Id. at 1355 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 
S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010)) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 42. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). The court 
dodged the question about whether Nuijten’s process for creating signals sufficed. 
 43. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); see In re Bilski, 545 
F.3d at 958-60. 
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be easy to draft around; most computer-implemented process claims can be re-
written as a machine or article of manufacture claims.44  
Second, is a general-purpose computer a “specific machine,” as per Alap-
pat? The Federal Circuit expressly reserved this question in In re Bilski.45 If it 
is, Bilski arguably invalidates tens of thousands of existing patents but will be 
easy to draft around in the future. But it would be a bit odd to say that Bilski’s 
hedging method becomes patentable if he adds “in a computer” at the end. The 
BPAI has mostly (and the district courts have unanimously) read Bilski to say 
that a general-purpose computer is not enough, though patent examiners have 
reportedly been more forgiving of such claims.46 
If these ambiguities are resolved—as they seem to have been so far—by 
concluding that you cannot evade the machine-or-transformation test by adding 
the phrase “in a computer” or by redrafting the claim as a system claim, the 
machine element of the machine-or-transformation test appears to be quite re-
strictive. That in turn leads to some bizarre results. It will lead to efforts to draft 
claims to software run on specific machines, but—since the computer used is 
irrelevant in most software patents—patentees may try to write dozens of 
claims, each to a specific “machine” implementing their program. If that works, 
owners of existing patents will find their claims invalid because they didn’t use 
the “magic words,”47 but going forward the strategy may allow patentees to 
approximate the effect of claiming their software on a general-purpose comput-
er. If it doesn’t work, the law will be drawing artificial distinctions between 
programs of equivalent inventiveness. For example, it seems pointless to say 
that the same software invention is patentable if it works only in an MRI ma-
chine but unpatentable if otherwise-identical software can be run on a PC. 
At the same time, application of that rule seems underinclusive. Suppose 
we write a new song.48 Can we patent it? Not as such, but arguably the song 
could pass the machine-or-transformation test if we record it using an iTunes 
codec and claim it as a method implemented digitally on an MP3 player. After 
all, the song is claimed only on particular machines specially designed for that 
purpose.49 How about the arbitration process in Comiskey?50 Does it really be-
 
 44. A process that is implemented in a computer can be claimed either as a process or 
as a computer system that is programmed to perform the steps of the process. Only the form 
has changed.  
 45. See 545 F.3d at 962 (“We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise con-
tours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular questions, such as 
whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular ma-
chine.”). 
 46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 47. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 8, at 9 (describing the “doctrine of the magic 
words”). 
 48. Don’t worry, we haven’t. 
 49. Cf. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Through the expedient of putting his music on known structure, 
can a composer now claim as his invention the structure of a compact disc or player piano 
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come patentable if run on a particular computer? We are confident that the 
adopters of the machine-or-transformation test didn’t intend those results. A 
specific machine seems an unnecessary limitation in some cases, and an insuf-
ficient one in others. The reason is the same in both cases: the test is focusing 
on the tail (the prior art machine with which the new invention works) and ig-
noring the dog (the new invention itself). 
Application of the transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation 
test produces even more bizarre results. What does it mean to transform some-
thing “to another state or thing”? The Federal Circuit in In re Bilski expressly 
rejected the idea from Comiskey that physical steps are required.51 But it also 
seemed to reimport that limitation by talking about machines or transformations 
of articles. The result is ambiguity whether a physical thing, or merely a rela-
tionship among things, needs to be transformed. Is FedEx patentable subject 
matter because packages are moved from place to place, or must the packages 
themselves be changed? Is a method of swinging a golf putter transformative 
because it results in a golf ball being moved to a different place than it other-
wise would have been?52  
The Federal Circuit decision in In re Bilski suggests—mostly—that trans-
formation requires some physical change to the patented thing itself. The Su-
preme Court language from which it is taken, after all, speaks of 
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing.”53 
Carving wood into a chair “transforms” it into a new thing—a chair. Chemical 
reactions change the state of the chemicals involved. But there remains the 
problem of whether the transformation is sufficient, especially with respect to 
process claims. 
Unfortunately, the analysis becomes even more confusing. Despite the pre-
ference for physical transformation, the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski (in its 
oddest passage) concludes that transforming data itself can meet this test in cer-
tain circumstances. Citing Abele, the court distinguishes between invalid gener-
al claims to outputting data results and valid specific claims to outputting par-
ticular data made using a particular machine.54 The court endorses the latter as 
long as the data “represents physical objects or substances.”55 The machine is 
the same, the transformation is the same—a computer has different bits set than 
it otherwise would, which means that the electrical impulses across gates on its 
 
roll containing the melody he discovered and obtain a patent therefor? The answer must be 
no.”). 
 50. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 51. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960-61 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 52. Cf. Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Indus-
try Norms, 2009 BYU L. REV. 875, 876 (describing the throwing of a curve ball as transfor-
mative). 
 53. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. 
 55. Id. 
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chips are in a different array. But to the Federal Circuit the result is transforma-
tive if, but only if, the data these bits refer to represents a physical thing. Kevin 
Collins has referred to this as meta-tangibility: the question is not whether the 
invention is tangible, but whether the intangible invention refers to something 
that is itself tangible.56 
Coal (the subject of the contracts in Bilski) is plainly a real-world physical 
thing. Would claim 1 in Bilski survive if it added a reference to the physical 
thing that was the subject of the contract? If an algorithm can only be used in a 
computer (as in Benson), does displaying the results from that algorithm render 
the invention patentable? This approach makes no sense. As with the machine 
prong, the transformation test is not focused on the invention, but on something 
external to it. 
The Federal Circuit created this meta-tangibility data transformation excep-
tion to explain the result in In re Abele.57 That case held that a narrow claim 
directed to a program that displayed the results of a CAT scan was patentable 
subject matter, but that a broad claim that purported to patent the use of a calcu-
lation to shade display images was not.58 But as described in In re Bilski, the 
distinction is illogical. 
To presage our argument in Part II, the real issue in Abele is not whether 
the information being displayed relates to something physical. The issue is 
overclaiming. Tailored claims should survive even if they aren’t transforming 
anything physical, but broad claims that encompass any sort of data shouldn’t. 
But that’s not the way it works under the machine-or-transformation test. If we 
hope to limit patentable subject matter in a predictable and rational way, the 
machine-or-transformation test is not the way to do it. In the next Part, we in-
troduce our alternative. 
II. THE THEORY OF SUBJECT MATTER RESTRICTIONS  
Patent eligibility requires that the subject matter clear two primary hurdles. 
First, each claim must fall within one of the statutory buckets: process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter.59 These groupings are categori-
cal—either a claim falls within the statute or it does not. 
Second, each claim must fall outside of one of the common law exceptions: 
abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena.60 It is here that Bilski 
and its predecessors are the most opaque: each case purports to grant or deny 
 
 56. See Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on In re Bilski: Tangibility Gone 
Meta, PATENTLY-O BLOG, 1 (Nov. 1, 2008), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/           
collinsmetabilski.pdf. 
 57. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63. 
 58. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 59. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 60. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
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eligibility to a particular patent claim, but fails to provide guidance about how 
to handle the next claim.61 Bilski makes clear that while the Supreme Court has 
no intention of abandoning these old exceptions, neither does it intend to pro-
vide further guidance. Perhaps even worse, the guidance we have from the ma-
chine-or-transformation test isn’t helping. A principled theory is needed. 
A. Prior Subject Matter Theories 
The traditional way academics think about patentable subject matter is as a 
gatekeeper: a means of excluding certain types of inventions entirely from the 
scope of patent protection.62 Gatekeeping approaches have proven unsatisfacto-
ry. While they may serve to reduce administrative and judicial costs in deter-
mining eligible subject matter, gatekeeping theories are necessarily bright-line 
rules: they will both exclude some patents that should be granted and fail to ex-
clude others that should not. We think this unwise. The core mission of patent 
law is to create incentives for the production, disclosure, and commercialization 
of socially valuable inventions. The flexibility of any subject matter require-
ment is paramount given the rapidly changing nature of technology. For exam-
ple, prior to Bilski, the Court last considered the scope of patentable subject 
matter in 1981, based on inventions made nearly a decade earlier.63 At the time 
those inventions were made, the biotechnology and personal computer indus-
tries were just starting, there was no such thing as a cell phone, and the Internet 
was something used by only a few computer scientists at universities. Had the 
Court created an inflexible rule in 1981 governing the patentability of software 
or communications technologies from 1970, that rule could have had a range of 
 
 61. See generally Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 649 
(2008) (noting that current subject matter rules “cannot be applied narrowly”). 
 62. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Claims to Information Qua Information and a 
Structural Theory of Section 101, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 11 (2008); Kevin 
Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317 (2007); Kevin Emerson Col-
lins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1378 (2010); 
Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Business-
Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823 (2003); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection 
for Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on 
Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 86-87 (1999); Menell, supra note 20, at 
1312-13 (arguing that patents should be limited to the technological arts); David S. Olson, 
Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable 
Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 184 (2009); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: 
The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related 
Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1042-43 (1990); Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, 
“Clues” for Determining Whether Business and Service Innovations Are Unpatentable Ab-
stract Ideas, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 110 (2010) (arguing that business methods should 
generally be unpatentable despite Bilski); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Pro-
fessions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Inventions After 
Bilski: History and Theory (Feb. 07, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1757272.  
 63. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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unintended consequences, preventing the patenting of important new inventions 
in a wide range of fields. Quite simply, innovation in industry must necessarily 
include innovation in applied processes.  
Furthermore, gatekeeping rules don’t have very clear lines;64 subject mat-
ter category delineation is notoriously elusive. There is no clear division be-
tween “software” and “nonsoftware” patents, or a computer system that imple-
ments a “business method” and one that implements another type of process, or 
between “technological” and “nontechnological” inventions. Lack of rigidity is 
not inherently bad; we suggest a flexible, factors-based test ourselves. But be-
cause gatekeeping rules attempt to draw conceptual lines around classes of 
technology with unclear boundaries—instead of using the policy-based factors 
that should drive patentable subject matter determinations—the result is a set of 
tests that overexclude and underexclude in a costly and haphazard way.  
One of us has gone so far as to argue that the best solution is to abandon all 
exceptions, including the historical ones.65 Whether or not this approach is cor-
rect, it is unlikely to gain judicial support in light of Bilski. Therefore, we take 
the common law abstract ideas exception as a given, and seek to articulate a 
reason to preclude patentability for abstract ideas and a corresponding way to 
recognize when patent claims are too abstract. We recognize that this better 
way has been elusive. Even those commentators who agree that the abstract 
ideas exception is a scope limitation device fail to provide a principled way to 
apply the standard.66 Instead, they usually rely on § 112 of the Patent Act, con-
flating overbreadth for patentable subject matter purposes with enablement and 
written description.67 
 
 64. Even the categories in the Patent Act are sometimes difficult to apply. See, e.g., 
Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1931) (determining whether an 
orange dipped in borax is a “manufacture”); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353-57 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (determining whether an electrical signal falls into a statutory category). 
 65. See Risch, supra note 61, at 591. 
 66. For example, T.J. Chiang argues that patentable subject matter encompasses both 
gatekeeping and scope limitations, and suggests that the abstract ideas exclusion is primarily 
a scope limitation. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1363, 1381. He does not, however, attempt to articulate the scope-
limitation analysis. For other scope-related theories of patentable subject matter, see, for ex-
ample, Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 
323, 387-89 (2010); Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive Patentable Software: Are There Still 
Diehr or Was It Just a Flook?, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 363, 365 n.8 (1993); Bryan Treglia, 
Separating Abstract Ideas and Laws of Nature from Patentable Subject Matter, 48 
JURIMETRICS J. 427, 434-37 (2008). 
 67. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s Business 
Method Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope 8-10 (Oct. 27, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698633. 
LEMLEY-63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2011 1:10 PM 
1328 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1315 
B. Abstract Ideas as Scope Limitation 
We start with the unremarkable observation that the statutory categories 
outlined in § 101—”process, machine, manufacture, and composition of mat-
ter”—are of relatively limited usefulness in analyzing whether a patent claim 
falls within patentable subject matter. Indeed, because patent claims almost 
never fall outside of the four fundamental categories of § 101, when they do it 
is noteworthy. For example, in In re Nuijten, the Federal Circuit held that an 
electrical signal alone—not tied to any storage or transmission medium—did 
not fall within any of the categories.68 We might also think of the per se bars 
against claims that encompass laws of nature and no more, like gravity and re-
lativity, as similar in kind: such claims are not patentable subject matter be-
cause, without more, they are usually not processes, machines, manufactures, 
or compositions of matter. By contrast, there is no per se bar to patenting laws 
of nature as applied in a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter. As a general matter, the traditional examples of barred subject matter 
are typically the easy cases. The harder (and more pressing) question is how to 
analyze claims falling within the statutory categories.  
This is the role for the common law exceptions to patentable subject mat-
ter: excluding, for policy reasons, claims to subject matter irrespective of their 
categorical status. And in order to appropriately apply the exceptions, one must 
first understand their theory and the particular policy problem they are address-
ing.  
In our view, the abstract ideas exception is directed to an inherent tension 
between two major policy goals of the patent system. First, inventors should be 
entitled to claim all that they have actually invented (or at least all that they 
have taught to the world via their patent disclosure)—thereby implementing the 
incentive structure that lies at the heart of the patent grant. Limiting inventors 
to the particular machine they developed would make patents a “hollow and 
useless thing.”69 Second, we want to further the progress of society by conti-
nually growing the storehouse of knowledge. In some cases, these goals can be 
in substantial tension—particularly where a patentee’s claimed invention would 
curtail access to ideas that are in essence reserved to society.  
But what ideas are reserved to society? Those that are fundamental, the 
building blocks of human thought: “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamen-
tal truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can 
claim in either of them an exclusive right.”70 Importantly, patentees can and 
 
 68. 500 F.3d at 1351, 1353. Even that conclusion was questionable as a matter of 
physics and statutory interpretation. John F. Duffy, In re Nuijten: Patentable Subject Matter, 
Textualism and the Supreme Court, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Feb. 5, 2007), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/DuffyOnNuijten.pdf. Even so, the policy consequences of 
holding that a signal is “made” whenever it passes through a wire would have been dire.  
 69. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
 70. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853). 
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often do employ abstract ideas or scientific principles to a useful and practical 
end, and when they do they are entitled to a patent. The worry is not that an in-
ventor controls the application of an abstract idea, but only that an inventor ob-
tains rights over the idea itself. That is, the abstract ideas exception operates 
where a patent claim is “too broad” in the sense that it encroaches upon socie-
ty’s right to unfettered access to scientific truths, fundamental principles, and 
the like; these properly belong in the commons upon which future innovations 
can be built, “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”71  
This concern about overbreadth is not, we think, limited to the abstract 
ideas doctrine; it also animates the prohibition against patenting products of na-
ture. Here, the law has repeatedly emphasized that the patent law is designed to 
protect applications of human ingenuity, not simply “nature’s handiwork.”72 
Thus, while a man-made organism is eligible for patentability,73 a natural bac-
terium is not.74 But natural products or phenomena can be patented when they 
are put to a specific new use. The boundary is neither the form of the invention 
nor its ability to “transform” nature; instead the analysis turns on whether the 
patent claims describe the application of human knowledge to a practical end, 
rather than merely identification of the existence of useful properties. In this 
way, a claim to an abstract idea is like a claim to a product of nature: not li-
mited to real-world applications of human inventiveness, and thus ineligible for 
patenting.  
Understood in this way, the abstract ideas doctrine is not about finding a 
conceptual category of inventions that is entitled to no protection at all, nor 
about determining the quality of the disclosure. Instead, it is about encouraging 
cumulative innovation and furthering societal norms regarding access to know-
ledge by preventing patentees from claiming broad ownership over fields of 
exploration rather than specific applications of those fields. Boiling these prin-
ciples down to a practical test is a more difficult task. The abstract ideas excep-
tion should disallow those claims to ideas unmoored to real-world applications, 
taking into account the extent to which the claim forecloses after-arising embo-
diments of the idea, the nature and extent of the prior art, and the level of dis-
closure by the inventor. 
C. Distinguishing the Scope Limitations in § 101 and § 112 
Patent law has other doctrines that limit the scope of claims. Section 112 
requires that a patentee claim no more than she has described in writing and 
 
 71. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 72. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980); see also Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 
at 131. 
 73. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.  
 74. See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. 
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taught others how to make and use.75 But overbreadth as a limitation on a pa-
tentable subject matter differs in motivation and effect from scope limitations 
imposed under § 112.  
First, § 112 merely examines whether the disclosure is sufficient to warrant 
the claims.76 While some claims may be too broad in light of the disclosure, 
they are not necessarily abstract ideas.77 Relatedly, enablement does not pro-
vide enough of a limitation on scope as the level of skill in the art goes up.78 
Overclaiming under § 101, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with re-
moving obstructions to follow-on innovation. The question is not whether one 
could make the embodiments claimed, but rather whether the inventor has con-
tributed enough to merit a claim so broad that others will be locked out.79  
Removing certain inventions—particularly inventive principles—from pa-
tentability diminishes burdens to follow-on inventors who might make use of 
those principles in new embodiments or applications of the principle. If we al-
lowed exclusionary rights over broad principles, later inventors wanting to em-
ploy those principles in new inventions would need to license rights to the orig-
inal patent, thereby increasing the costs to follow-on invention. The precise 
level of “abstractness” of a given claim at which follow-on invention is overly 
burdened is somewhat arbitrary.80 Nonetheless, when a patent claim would fo-
reclose all future embodiments or applications of the inventive principle 
claimed in a patent, courts have balked. That is true even if the patentee has 
enabled others to use all currently known embodiments, thus satisfying § 112. 
In the words of the Supreme Court, such claims “wholly pre-empt” all present 
and future uses of the inventive principle.81 
Second, the enablement and written description requirements of § 112 con-
cern the adequacy of the inventor’s disclosure at the time of filing. Scope con-
cerns under § 101, however, relate to the possibility of invention after filing. 
Indeed, under § 112, as long as an inventor sufficiently discloses those embo-
 
 75. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 76. See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (holding that claim 
to light filaments made from any carbonized textile or vegetable fiber was too broad in light 
of disclosure that described only one type of fiber). 
 77. See, e.g., id. While the filament claims were broader than the disclosure allowed, 
they were not abstract.  
 78. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1164-65 (2002) (arguing that judicial attribution of high skill 
level to programmers has nullified enablement requirement for software patents); Michael 
Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 127, 
138-39 (2010) (arguing that description is critical because high skill means more claims with 
less disclosure of actual invention). 
 79. One of the authors has argued that we could accomplish the same end with a more 
capacious understanding of § 112. Risch, supra note 61, at 591. But we currently do not have 
such an understanding. 
 80. See infra Part III. 
 81. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63, 72 (1972)). 
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diments of the invention that could have been built at the time of filing, the in-
ventor will generally be afforded exclusionary rights over later inventions that 
use after-arising technology—technology that did not exist at the time of filing. 
Section 101, on the other hand, concerns itself precisely with the degree to 
which a patent claim will foreclose later-developed technology. Thus, even an 
inventor meeting the requirements of § 112 may write a claim so broad as to 
violate § 101. This distinction in timing is critical to understanding the differ-
ences in patent scope thresholds under the two sections. 
By removing overly abstract inventions from patenting, we drive more 
competition in research and development races to complete practical, applied 
inventions. In other words, by moving patenting downstream, we both permit 
competition in research and development and encourage competition among 
the practical, applied inventions developed by that research.82 Thus, by limiting 
claims to practical applications, as opposed to broadly claimed abstract inven-
tions, we help promote the goal of stimulating optimal invention. Section 112 
may have the prevention of gun jumping as a subsidiary goal, but an overclaim-
ing view of § 101 puts the primary focus on whether the claims reflect an ap-
plied principle. 
Finally, the enablement inquiry itself is extremely difficult and fraught 
with contradiction.83 Our focus under § 101 on claim scope with an eye toward 
practical application provides for a different type of analysis. It may be that 
claims are not abstract but also not enabled (like Incandescent Lamp) or it may 
be that claims are abstract, but enabled (like Benson). 
Similarly, definiteness concerns under § 112, paragraph 2, inform but do 
not replace our standard. Definiteness asks whether a person having ordinary 
skill in the art (PHOSITA) could understand the claims, regardless of how ab-
stract or applied they might be. Bilski’s claim to hedging was understandable, 
even if it was overbroad. Under § 101, we are concerned about the uncertainty 
and vagueness of claims over abstract ideas or natural laws that could thwart 
optimal invention by closing off avenues not invented (or inventible) by the pa-
tentee. Claims that are indefinite under § 101 may be clear in their language but 
 
 82. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 127 (2009) (arguing that inventions should be reduced to practice to im-
prove commercialization); see also Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 1195, 1224-34 (discussing practical utility as a commercialization lever); Ted Sichel-
man, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (2010) (discussing incentives 
provided by patent law to commercialize inventions). 
 83. See, e.g., T.J. Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 106 NW. 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434465 (noting that determining whether a claim is enabled re-
quires us to choose the level of abstraction at which we assess that claim); Timothy R. Hol-
brook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manu-
script at 18-19), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650819; Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The 
Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1141, 1168 (2008). 
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still lead to indeterminate results because they claim activities that are not un-
der the control of the person practicing the method.84  
D. Scope Limitation in the Case Law 
In our view, the theory articulated here explains most of the major cases 
implementing the § 101 abstract ideas exception. 
1. Historic cases 
Three historic cases illustrate how excluding abstract ideas limits claim 
scope. In O’Reilly v. Morse, the Supreme Court considered Samuel Morse’s pa-
tent on the telegraph.85 It allowed what many would consider today to be a 
business method claim: “the system of signs, consisting of dots and spaces, . . . 
in combination with machinery for recording them, as signals for telegraphic 
purposes.”86 It also allowed Morse’s claim to his particular telegraph. Howev-
er, the Court denied Morse’s claim to all transmission of printed information by 
an electromagnetic signal by any means.87 While the Court had no problem 
with patenting a particular form of such transmission—the telegraph—it invali-
dated the broader claim because Morse claimed all forms of printing at a dis-
tance without tying the claim to any process or machinery disclosed in the pa-
tent.88  
It is no surprise that many consider Morse to be an enablement case.89 But 
this explanation is incomplete, because the Court’s ruling goes beyond ordinary 
application of enablement. The Court’s concern is not just undue experimenta-
tion necessary to achieve the broad claim scope.90 Nor can the case solely be 
explained on the grounds of the written description doctrine.91 Although the 
Court stated that Morse “claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process 
 
 84. There may also be distributive concerns in § 101 analysis: subject matter jurispru-
dence consistently recites that certain principles must be “free to all men.” Funk Bros. Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). This language is not present in 
enablement and definiteness cases. 
 85. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
 86. Id. at 86. 
 87. See id. at 112-17. 
 88. See id. at 113; see also id. at 118-19 (describing the importance of description of 
the patented invention).  
 89. See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 51 (2008) (presenting Morse 
at the beginning of a patent textbook section on enablement). 
 90. Cf. The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895) (holding that enablement 
is based on undue experimentation); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (de-
scribing factors to consider for undue experimentation in enablement). 
 91. Cf. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1346 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“Morse, decided under the 1836 Act, can also be interpreted as involving a separate written 
description inquiry.”). 
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which he has not described,” it goes further by stating Morse’s claim would fo-
reclose “future inventor[s]” who “may discover a mode of writing or printing at 
a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current,” that is, after-arising 
technology.92 
Written description—like enablement—is measured at the time of filing. 
Thus, even claims that meet the written description requirement will generally 
foreclose “future inventors” who find new “means” of implementing the 
claimed invention, particularly for complex inventions composed of many sep-
arate components, any one of which might be replaced by after-arising technol-
ogy that still falls within the literal scope of the claim language. Thus, the con-
cern about follow-on invention in Morse cannot merely be explained by 
standard disclosure doctrines. Morse had, after all, taught the only way known 
at the time to use magnetism to print characters at a difference, so arguably he 
had satisfied the enablement standard as we understand it today. Instead, the 
Court’s concerns require a separate theory of scope, one premised on patent 
eligibility of overly abstract claims. 
In contrast with Morse’s claim is Bell’s patent on the telephone, which was 
upheld in the Telephone Cases.93 Bell discovered that voice could be transmit-
ted over a closed circuit by varying the amplitude of the electrical signal; this 
discovery solved a problem that inventors attempting to transmit voices by 
opening and closing circuits (like the telegraph) could not solve. Bell, however, 
was a prophetic inventor who did not complete a working embodiment before 
he applied for his patent.94 Indeed, he only described one embodiment of his 
broad claims. Further, though Bell claimed two ways to transmit speech—the 
vibration and the variable resistance method—the device he described would 
only use one of the two ways, the vibration method.95 And Bell did not de-
scribe how to make a device to practice the other way.96  
Nonetheless, the Court allowed a claim to the broad process of sending 
voice using either the vibration or the variable resistance method. The Court 
focused not on Bell’s failure, but on the practical use of his principle.97 
The Telephone Cases also mix concerns of disclosure under the enable-
ment doctrine with concerns about follow-on invention. Whether Bell provided 
sufficient disclosure to support his claim is a question of enablement—and, 
perhaps, in modern parlance, of written description. But whether the claim was 
sufficiently specific—here, claiming a “practicable way of putting [the prin-
ciple] into operation”98—is a § 101 overbreadth issue, because the specificity 
 
 92. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113. 
 93. 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
 94. See id. at 535. 
 95. See id. at 538. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. at 536. 
 98. Id.  
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of the claim affects the latitude with which follow-on invention may be under-
taken. 
In this latter respect, the Court made two important statements. First, the 
Court noted that Bell was not claiming more than a very specific application of 
the principle that he invented: “Both forms of apparatus operate on a closed 
circuit by gradual changes of intensity, and not by alternately making and 
breaking the circuit . . . .”99 Second, the Court noted that the general principle 
of gradual electrical changes provided a specific, applied solution that was not 
available before.100 
Bell was entitled to the general and broad method that he discovered be-
cause he was able to describe “the exact electrical condition that must be 
created to accomplish his purpose.”101 The Court distinguished this from 
Morse’s unapplied claim to all electromagnetic transmissions by any means:  
It may be that electricity cannot be used at all for the transmission of speech 
except in the way Bell has discovered, and that therefore, practically, his pa-
tent gives him its exclusive use for that purpose, but that does not make his 
claim one for the use of electricity distinct from the particular process with 
which it is connected in his patent.102 
Here, too, the question is whether Bell attempted to claim more than a new, 
specific, practical, and applied benefit. The Court said no—the specific solution 
to a specific problem might have broad application, but it was an application of 
the inventive principle. Other inventors remained free to investigate other ways 
of communicating voice over an electric wire because Bell did not claim all 
transmissions of voice by any means or machinery.  
A third example is Mackay Radio, in which a well-known equation pre-
dicted the optimal wire lengths for receiving radio signals.103 The patentee 
(who did not discover the equation) claimed an antenna using these lengths. 
The Supreme Court held that the antenna was a patent-eligible application of 
the equation: “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is 
not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of 
knowledge of scientific truth may be.”104 The Court made clear that claim 
scope was the key factor in determining whether the antenna was patentable, 
and that the application of a known principle would be narrowly construed.105 
Mackay illustrates two fundamental points in our theory. First, practical 
applications of so-called “abstract ideas” are patentable. Second, consideration 
of a claim’s contribution to applied uses is a matter of claim scope. Applying a 
 
 99. Id. at 538. 
100. See id. at 544. 
101. Id. at 535. 
102. Id. 
103. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1939).  
104. Id. at 94. 
105. See id. 
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basic scientific principle to the construction of a useful object is patentable; 
claiming every use of that principle isn’t.  
2. Modern Supreme Court cases 
Our scope theory is also largely consistent with the Court’s more recent 
“abstract idea” decisions. In Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court invalidated a 
claim to a process for converting binary coded decimal numbers into pure bi-
nary format.106 The method was well-known, and could be done by pencil, but 
had not been implemented by computer.107 The process claim, the Court ruled, 
was simply too broad and untied to any application, especially in comparison to 
the contribution of the inventor: “Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and 
sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary 
conversion. The end use may . . . be performed through any existing machinery 
or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.”108 In short, whatever 
was new about the invention was unmoored to any practical application, such 
that it was “so abstract and sweeping” as to unduly foreclose follow-on inven-
tion, particularly that using after-arising technologies. Given the Court’s con-
cern with “unknown uses” and “future-devised machinery,” Benson cannot 
merely be explained by traditional scope and disclosure doctrines. 
Nor are technology-driven explanations of Benson as rejecting all claims 
involving software or mathematical algorithms satisfying. For just nine years 
later in Diamond v. Diehr, without repudiating Benson, the Court upheld a 
process for curing rubber even though the process incorporated a well-known 
mathematical formula about how long to cure rubber.109 Diehr is a straightfor-
ward application of our theory—Diehr’s process was tied to a specific practical 
application of the formula that did not unduly foreclose future innovation rely-
ing on the formula. 
Even the outcome, though not the methodology, in the troublesome case of 
Parker v. Flook110 might be explained by our theory. In Flook, the Court ruled 
that a claimed method for updating an alarm limit in catalytic conversion using 
a specified algorithm was unpatentable under § 101.111 The problematic aspect 
of the case is its apparent reliance on “point of novelty” analysis—treating the 
mathematical algorithms that were the novel feature of the invention as if they 
were already known. This approach is problematic in many respects,112 and for 
that reason it is tempting to dismiss the case as an outlier. Indeed, the Court’s 
 
106. 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). 
107. See id. at 67. 
108. Id. at 68. 
109. 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
110. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
111. Id. at 594. 
112. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735045 (critiquing this aspect of Flook). 
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holding on point of novelty was essentially overruled a few years later in Di-
ehr.113  
Despite its doctrinal problems, the outcome in Flook can be understood as 
consistent with our theory. The inventor claimed a general method of calculat-
ing “alarm limits” in a catalytic conversion process.114 The process, however, 
did not purport to measure temperature, pressure, volume, or any other specific 
aspect of the catalytic conversion process. Thus, the claim was not tied to any 
application whatsoever. Yet the patent applicant wanted to bar all uses of the 
formula in any later application of it. Read this way, the Flook Court merely 
found that the patent applicant was claiming too broadly. The Court’s analysis 
revealed that Flook’s claim far exceeded—and indeed Flook never demonstrat-
ed—any real-world practical application, wholly preempting all present and fu-
ture uses of the alarm-limit algorithm not only in catalytic conversion, but po-
tentially elsewhere. Such a broad claim is properly barred by the abstract ideas 
exception. 
The Court’s rejection of Bilski’s claimed method of hedging is consistent 
with our theory. The patent application in Bilski described a very specific way 
to use historic weather data to determine optimal prices for hedging transac-
tions in particular commodities.115 Yet the first claim sought to patent all such 
hedging transactions, at any price, for any commodity.116 Like the other patent 
applicants outlined here, Bilski claimed too broadly—effectively seeking to 
control the idea of hedging, unmoored to the practical applications the inventor 
actually disclosed.  
We do think this analysis points to a failing in the Court’s Bilski opinion: it 
is too quick to reject each of the other claims. While close analysis may reveal 
that each of Bilski’s narrower claims was still too broad, the Court gave short 
shrift to such considerations. It is possible that Bilski narrowed the dependent 
claims sufficiently to cover only a specific, practical, even novel application. 
Finally, our theory provides the only reasonable explanation of the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in In re Abele,117 which otherwise seems an outlier. In Abele, 
the applicants invented an improvement in digital x-ray data processing that al-
lowed for better imaging while exposing patients to less radiation.118 The in-
vention involved narrowing an x-ray beam in order to reduce exposure, and a 
companion method of calculating the image data to correct for the deficiencies 
caused by a narrower beam.119  
 
113. 450 U.S. at 187. 
114. See In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 22 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
115. See Brief Amici Curiae of 20 Law and Business Professors in Support of Neither 
Party at 31-32, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964). 
116. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24. 
117. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
118. See id. at 903. 
119. See id. at 904. 
LEMLEY-63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2011 1:10 PM 
June 2011] LIFE AFTER BILSKI 1337 
The case involved two claims. Claim 5 covered a “method of displaying 
data” using certain calculations. Claim 6 was the same as claim 5, but limited to 
specific x-ray attenuation data.120 The court rejected the broad claim 5, but 
upheld the narrower claim 6. This result cannot be explained by saying that the 
broad claim did not transform anything, while the narrow claim did. Claim 5 
encompasses—without question—a specific way to process and display an im-
age. If, however, one were to focus on the intangibility of the result it produc-
es—images on a computer screen—then the x-ray related claim must also be an 
abstract idea. Those images are merely a subset of the images claimed in the 
broader claim, and processing x-ray data is no less abstract than processing 
other data. Nor can this result be justified by arguing—as the Federal Circuit 
does in formulating the machine-or-transformation test—that the data in claim 
6 represents “physical” phenomena while the data in claim 5 does not.121 Claim 
5 describes the display of a picture to which the data is related. A picture must 
necessarily be of something physical, so that the data must necessarily be re-
lated to something physical.  
The best, and perhaps only, explanation for this result is that claim 5 was 
simply too broad. While claim 6 is grounded in a particular application with 
practical results relating to x-ray technology, claim 5 is untethered to any spe-
cific application or technology. While the picture of claim 5 was physical in 
some sense, there is no limitation whatsoever on what the picture might be of. 
Thus, the claim effectively covers all uses of the algorithm to improve the im-
age quality of the picture under consideration, foreclosing all present and future 
uses of the algorithm. Like the invalid claims in Morse, Benson, Flook, and Di-
ehr, such broad claims are too abstract. 
In short, we think the overclaiming approach is amply supported in the 
case law. The problem is that courts have not uniformly followed Diehr, nor 
have they explained the abstract ideas doctrine in a consistent and coherent 
way. The result has been that courts fall back on “clues” like the machine-or-
transformation test that, even if based in a theory of overclaiming, disserve that 
goal in practice. 
III. A PROPER APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING CLAIMS THAT IMPERMISSIBLY 
COVER ABSTRACT IDEAS 
Focusing on claim scope provides a principled way to determine whether a 
particular claim, rather than a particular subject matter, is unpatentable. Specif-
ically, our approach focuses on the application of the idea to determine the 
proper level of abstraction that merits protection. As claims become broader—
and necessarily more general and abstract—they become more indefinite and 
difficult to understand, and more likely to ensnare future inventions embodying 
 
120. See id. at 908. 
121. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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the inventive principle. At their limit, they claim everything and contribute 
nothing. The practical effect of allowing such breadth is to make later im-
provements more costly or even impossible.  
To be sure, identifying overclaiming is not straightforward, and no test will 
yield conclusive answers. Yet we believe some tests are clearly more worka-
ble—and better further the policy-based goals of § 101—than others. This Part 
discusses why the machine-or-transformation test is unsuitable, and then pro-
vides a better way to identify improper claims. 
A. The Failure of the Machine-or-Transformation Test 
As discussed in Part I, continued reliance on the machine-or-transformation 
test is problematic because that test has little to do with claim scope. For exam-
ple, it fails to identify why the claims in Benson and Flook should be unpatent-
able when both are unambiguously performed by a machine. To be sure, the 
insignificant postsolution activity test provides an exception to the rule, but 
every software patent will be executed on a machine. If every such claim is re-
viewed for “insignificant” activity, the exception becomes the rule without any 
definition of what “insignificance” is. 
A focus on physicality fares no better. For instance, the Federal Circuit 
held in Prometheus that the claimed medical diagnostic test sufficiently trans-
formed matter, because “[t]he transformation is of the human body following 
administration of a drug.”122 Chemical transformations that occur within the 
body, however, could just as plausibly be characterized as “insignificant extra-
solution activity,” because they simply relate to a mere “data-gathering step”123 
that is tangential to the process performed directly by the diagnostic test. The 
court’s conclusory reasoning about transformation does not answer the ques-
tion; as Abele shows, a method may transform data about physical subject mat-
ter but still be too broad.  
The problem is that the machine-or-transformation test simply asks the 
wrong question. For example, in Comiskey, the arbitration process was unpa-
tentable not because it lacked a computer, but because the claim embraced 
countless arbitration arrangements untied to any practical application of their 
idea. The application claimed too much.  
This is likely to be a recurring problem in software cases in particular. The 
genius of computer technology is that it is a platform that allows creation to oc-
cur on it. A computer program can be claimed in terms specific or general, but 
today (except by happenstance) it would rarely be logically limited to running 
on a particular type of hardware. Requiring that software claims be tied to par-
ticular machines would indeed impose a limitation on their scope, but the limi-
 
122. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).  
123. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. 
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tation would bear no relationship to what the patentee actually invented. The 
first programmer to build a dynamic linked list shouldn’t own the concept, and 
it doesn’t help to say that he owns the concept when implemented on a Dell 
computer but not a Mac. Limiting the scope of a patent claim makes sense only 
if the limitation bears some relationship to the inventive aspect of the claimed 
invention. In software patents, hardware is almost never the inventive aspect. 
Machines and transformations may be relevant to this inquiry, but only as a 
way to conceptualize whether a claim is overbroad. Treating machine-or-
transformation as a proxy or other subpart of a gatekeeping test is ill-advised. 
B. Identifying Abstract Ideas 
Claims are proper when the scope of the patentee’s claims is commensu-
rate with a practical, real world contribution the patentee has made. They are 
too broad when they assert coverage over general ideas unmoored to any spe-
cific use, and therefore deprive subsequent researchers of access to those ideas. 
Make no mistake—determining whether claims are abstract must be performed 
case by case. Even so, courts and litigants need not be entirely at sea. We have 
rules (and standards) that guide us in determining whether a claim is enabled, 
novel, and so forth. Here, too, we have a baseline requirement: that the claim be 
tied to a practical, applied contribution of the inventor. The factors that follow 
are tools to answer this question, but the question itself is one that can have a 
principled answer. 
One factor that courts should consider is the generative nature of the new 
technology. Is the claimed invention one with a very limited set of possible ap-
plications? If so, we might not worry about locking up future avenues of re-
search. Patent claims to inventions that are ends in themselves, rather than 
means to new ends, are less likely to create § 101 overbreadth problems. The 
Benson Court worried that the patentee would lock up the principle of binary-
coded-decimal conversion. But the more specific a mathematical algorithm 
gets, the less likely it is to be useful outside the context of the patented inven-
tion. If Windows 7 is a mathematical algorithm (and in one sense, it is), it is not 
one we need worry much about preventing others from using for different ends. 
By contrast, the newer a field, and the more likely it is to have a variety of ap-
plications, the more reluctant we should be to award ownership of generative 
building blocks to people who have not yet explored how they may be applied.  
Second, the nature of the industry in which the invention occurs may be re-
levant. While all inventors depend to some extent on the work of others, some 
industries are more likely to rely on cumulative innovation than others, and the 
danger of allowing patents on abstract claims is correspondingly greater in 
those industries. We think that explains why we have seen abstract idea cases 
almost exclusively in the electronic and computer arts, rather than in, say, the 
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pharmaceutical industry.124 That is not to say a patentee could never overclaim 
in a mechanical art. Imagine, for instance, the inventor of the first catheter 
claiming “any means, however developed, for noninvasive surgical intervention 
in the human body.” But the damage that such broad claims can do will be 
greater in industries that rely more heavily on cumulative innovation.125 
Third, on a related note, industries differ in the speed with which advances 
are made. Because patents expire after twenty years, the cost of an overbroad 
patent claim may be less in a slow-moving field than in one that changes quick-
ly. The Morse Court was prescient to suggest that eventually someone might 
happen upon other means than the telegraph of using electromagnetism to 
communicate at a distance, but as it happened, Morse’s patent claims would 
have expired by the time the first of those new technologies was developed. But 
that will not always be the case, and in newer and faster-changing industries the 
risk of stifling after-arising technology is greater. 
Fourth, courts should be particularly wary of general claims to a principle 
based on one or very few specific applications. When a patentee identifies only 
one specific application, but claims a very broad principle, it is more likely that 
the broader claim will encompass unanticipated applications. This situation in-
creases the likelihood that others will need access to the claimed principle, 
access that might be denied or limited to the public’s detriment. To be sure, 
written description and enablement analysis under § 112 also examines such 
concerns; claims that are not described and enabled are also more likely to be 
abstract. When applied to abstract ideas, however, this factor can extend 
beyond § 112. Because § 101 is not tied to the filing date of the application, 
courts can consider potential (even hypothetical) technologies that might tech-
nically be enabled, but that are not supported by the application presented by 
the inventor. Further, § 112 sometimes permits patentees to claim a genus by 
relying on only a single example. While one example may enable one of skill in 
the art to practice a range of alternatives, § 101 might still impose limits on the 
resulting claim. 
Fifth, courts should consider the importance of the patentee’s contribution. 
Strictly speaking, importance has no bearing on how abstract the patentee’s 
claims are, but as we indicated earlier, overclaiming is about balancing the in-
centives needed for the patentee against the risk of stifling future innovation. 
Truly groundbreaking patents may require broader protection for the simple 
reason that an inventor who opens up a new field may have less idea how her 
invention will be used by others. We can’t effectively assess that balance unless 
we have some sense of how important the patentee’s invention is, as well as 
 
124. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 142-66 (2009) (identifying abstract ideas doctrine as a policy lever 
that is likely to be more important in some industries than others). 
125. The authors are not of one mind as to whether (and how much) courts should ex-
pressly consider the industry in deciding abstractness, but there is little question that abstract 
ideas claims will be more common in certain industries. 
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how important the future innovation might be. An old doctrine once held that 
“pioneering” patents were to be given broad scope.126 That doctrine is now mo-
ribund, brought down by the singular focus on patent claim language to define 
an invention’s scope. Yet the idea of pioneering patents might usefully be ap-
plied in this different context to give greater leeway to those who arguably 
teach more. The more important the patentee’s contribution, the more we 
should err on the side of allowing broad claims at the margins.127  
In sum, we believe at least five factors are critical to a proper scope-based 
determination for patentable subject matter eligibility under § 101: 
• Is the claimed invention potentially generative of many kinds of new  
     inventions? 
• Does the industry rely heavily on cumulative invention? 
• Is the technological field fast-moving? 
• Has the patentee disclosed a small number of embodiments but claimed  
     a broad inventive principle? 
• Has the patentee made an important contribution relative to the prior  
     art? 
No one factor should dominate; we advocate a contextual, common-law 
approach. Courts and scholars are likely to develop other factors as our ap-
proach is applied over time. 
C. Overclaiming and the Decision Process 
Finally, thinking about § 101 and the abstract ideas doctrine as scope limi-
tations may help change the way we approach subject matter procedurally. The 
“gatekeeper” theory carries with it the logical consequence that § 101 eligibility 
should be decided first. After all, if your invention isn’t eligible for patenting at 
all, we don’t need to figure out whether it’s new and nonobvious and whether 
you have taught people how to make and use it. And so the Federal Circuit in 
 
126. See, e.g., Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 207 (1894) (“If the invention is 
broad or primary in its character, the range of equivalents will be correspondingly broad, un-
der the liberal construction which the courts give to such inventions.”); Perkin-Elmer Corp. 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A pioneer invention is 
entitled to a broad range of equivalents.”); John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Pa-
tent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 37 (1995) (“Courts construe pio-
neer patent claims . . . to encompass a broader range of so-called ‘equivalents’ during an in-
fringement determination.”). 
127. See Kokomo Fence Mach. Co. v. Kitselman, 189 U.S. 8, 18-19 (1903) (“In view of 
what passed in the Patent Office, and the state of the art, we cannot regard the Kitselman pa-
tent as a pioneer patent, but think its claims must be limited in their scope to the actual com-
bination of essential parts as shown . . . .”). 
LEMLEY-63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2011 1:10 PM 
1342 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1315 
Comiskey strongly suggested, if not required, that § 101 be decided before eve-
rything else.128 
That is a mistake. There were many, many ways to reject Bilski’s claim 1. 
As a result, both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court approached the 
case with the preconception that Bilski should lose, and looked to the only 
available doctrine allowed by the procedural posture—§ 101—to make sure 
that he did.129 And so neither court was too careful about the doctrine it created 
or how it applied that doctrine, because the result in that case was foreordained. 
We think a subject-matter-first approach is backwards. Our claim-
overbreadth approach requires careful attention to what the patentee invented, 
what came before, and what might come after. It can’t logically be applied in 
advance of thinking about the other issues in a patent case. Indeed, we agree 
with a number of commentators that the right time to apply § 101 is as a back-
stop after all other validity doctrines have been exhausted.130 We don’t need 
the abstract ideas doctrine to weed out claims like Bilski’s claim 1. Only once 
an invention is deemed new, nonobvious, described, and enabled should we ask 
whether there is nonetheless some reason to limit a claim. Asking the question 
later is likely both to produce a clearer answer—courts will have to think care-
fully about why they are rejecting such a claim—and to reduce the risk that we 
inappropriately carve entire areas of invention out of the patent system. 
D. Applying the Scope-Based Patentable Subject Matter Analysis 
We now apply our theory and factors to a variety of controversial claims. 
Of course, the evidence relating to these claims may differ from what we see in 
reported opinions; as such, reasonable minds can differ based on varying un-
derstandings of the factors involved. 
We first address the PTO’s request for examples of what might or might 
not constitute abstract ideas. While we believe that this Article might offer the 
PTO guidance, provision of specific examples would be fruitless. Indeed, that 
is the point of an overclaiming approach rather than a gatekeeper approach. We 
cannot know whether a particular claim is too abstract until we understand the 
inventive principles, prior art, industries, and potential downstream inventions. 
Of course, we can hypothesize, as we did with our example of the catheter in-
ventor claiming “all noninvasive surgery,” but such absurd claims are rare, 
 
128. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). But see In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d at 950-51 n.1 (stating that Comiskey did not require patentable subject matter to be 
examined first).  
129. Cf. Michael Risch, The Idea’s the Thing, LEGAL TIMES, May 12, 2008, available at 
http://law.wvu.edu/r/download/9874 (expressing concern that the weakness of Bilski’s appli-
cation would cause courts to create over-restrictive subject matter rules). 
130. See, e.g., Christopher T. Abernethy, Cruel Hand of Bilski: Culminating the Short-
sighted Crusade for Marginalization of the ‘Process’ Patent 27-37 (May 2009) (unpublished 
comment), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420205. 
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and—like Bilski’s—are almost always invalid for many reasons unrelated to 
their abstractness. We thus focus on some closer cases. 
One such case is Metabolite,131 in which the patentee claimed a method for 
diagnosing a vitamin deficiency by measuring total homocysteine in the blood 
and correlating elevated levels with a deficiency.132 Three Justices argued that 
this claim was an unpatentable natural phenomenon.133 While some agree, oth-
ers criticize this view because every medical diagnostic method (and most 
every treatment method) boils down to a natural phenomenon.134  
Our analysis would instead focus on whether the claim is an application of 
the natural phenomena or whether it is so broad as to be unmoored from any 
specific application. It is difficult to dispute that the use of the relationship be-
tween total homocysteine and vitamin levels to diagnose a deficiency is applied 
in some sense, because it is implemented in a specific test that compares the 
relationship between two substances in the body. At the same time, the claim is 
broad, because any homocysteine test—including tests not yet invented—will 
infringe if it is used to diagnose the deficiency. 
The question becomes whether the claim is overbroad in the § 101 sense. 
Importantly, the claim does not preclude follow-on invention of new kinds of 
general diagnostic tests that measure the relationship between any and all sub-
stances in the body. Rather, the Metabolite test diagnoses a particular vitamin 
deficiency. Further, it uses one particular blood test—total homocysteines—not 
every blood test. Others are free to develop new blood measurements and new 
ways to test for this particular deficiency, even if they cannot use the particular 
method disclosed in the patent. And the claim does not cover other possible 
uses of the relationship, such as medical interventions that aim at reducing total 
homocysteine. Applying some of our factors, the technology was not generative 
and the industry is not particularly speedy, so the risk of locking up further im-
provements to this specific test seems low. Further, the claim appears to be tied 
to the disclosed embodiment because the inventors described the principles at 
work and the failures of other tests. In short, we find it unlikely that future in-
ventors were blocked from creating new diagnostic tests in general, or even 
new ways to diagnose this particular deficiency. The primary concern, instead, 
was that downstream users would have to pay to exploit the discovery of the 
inventors, but that potential comes with every patent; there is no guarantee any 
downstream user will be able to invent around any particular patent claim. 
 
131. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006). 
Disclosure: Author Mark A. Lemley represented the patentee in this case. 
132. See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006). 
133. See Metabolite Labs., 126 S. Ct. at 2922, 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
134. See Risch, supra note 61, at 600 (“Everything that happens may be deemed the 
work of nature . . . .” (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 
134-35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Another medical diagnostic test example is Prometheus,135 in which the 
patentee claimed a method for adjusting medication for any given patient by 
measuring how much of the medicine’s metabolites appear in that patient’s 
body.136 The district court invalidated the patent because the amount of meta-
bolization by any given patient was a natural phenomenon.137 The Federal Cir-
cuit reversed, holding (both before and again after Bilski) that because the drug 
was transformed in the human body—and indeed transformed the body itself—
the patent satisfied the machine-or-transformation test.138 Neither of these rul-
ings is particularly helpful from an abstract ideas standpoint. The district 
court’s focus was misplaced because there was nothing natural about the drug’s 
effect on the body—it was an artificial drug and no human would ever react to 
it in nature.139  
The Federal Circuit’s analysis, by contrast, would allow too much. A pa-
tent claim can transform something and still be overbroad. If, for example, the 
patentee claimed all correlations of every drug in the body, the claim would 
certainly be abstract but would still pass the Federal Circuit’s test. Our ap-
proach provides a way out of the thicket. Here, the claim was to very specific 
measurements of a particular drug. Like Metabolite, Prometheus involves an 
application of the natural principles discovered by the patentee. It is not genera-
tive, nor will it unduly bar future inventors. If, however, this claim were ex-
panded to cover all drugs without any specific measurements, then it would be 
an abstract idea. 
Metabolite and Prometheus concern inventions in the biotech and medical 
fields. Another field worthy of discussion is computer software. As we men-
tioned earlier, in Benson, the Supreme Court found a claimed algorithm used to 
convert data on a computer from one format to another was too broad, because 
it was not moored to any specific practical application. As such, it unduly pre-
vented follow-on invention because it wholly preempted all use of the algo-
rithm in any application whatsoever.  
As we also noted, however, the Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences 
has out-of-hand rejected software claims under the machine-or-transformation 
test that require a more rigorous analysis under our proposed test. For instance, 
in Ex parte Heuer, the Board rejected a claim to a method for decoding a binary 
 
135. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (granting 
certiorari, vacating underlying judgment, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Bils-
ki). 
136. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543. 
137. See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25062 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d, 581 F.3d 1336, vacated and remanded, 
130 S. Ct. 3543. 
138. See Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1345-46; see also Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (on remand). 
139. See Brief of Amici Curiae Interested Patent Law Professors in Support of Neither 
Party at 1, Prometheus, 581 F.3d 1336 (No. 2008-1403). 
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representation of a document, finding that nothing in the specification required 
any “hardware” and therefore no machine was claimed under the machine-or-
transformation test.140 Under an appropriate § 101 scope analysis, the relevant 
concern is not whether there is a physical machine per se in the specification or 
claim language. Rather, the question should be whether the claim is so abstract 
and sweeping as to preclude all uses of the inventive idea, or whether it is suffi-
ciently applied.  
The proposed claim in Heuer is similar to that of Benson in that it concerns 
a method for converting a set of data from one format to another. Unlike the 
algorithm in Benson, however, the claim in Heuer does not cover a general al-
gorithm, but instead a method of converting an XML-document that comprises 
particular steps. This factor weighs heavily in favor of patentability. On the 
other hand, those steps are relatively broad and cover implementations on any 
type of machine using any kind of XML data, including those not yet in-
vented—indeed, the claim is not even limited to a general-purpose computer. 
Because the software industry is rapidly changing, under our proposed test one 
might argue that the claim should be moored to a specific type of computer or 
data structure to pass muster. Yet such an insistence would in essence require 
all software claims to be limited to those types of computers in use today. This 
kind of approach would unquestionably limit the value of software patents, and 
in a way that is unnecessary to adequately protect follow-on invention. Instead, 
a better way to cabin the broad scope of software patents is, in addition to de-
termining whether the claim itself essentially covers merely the abstract idea at 
issue, to examine the contribution of the inventor relative to the prior art.  
As we noted earlier, this examination is distinct from a § 112 analysis. Al-
though an inventor will often meet the written description and enablement 
standards by merely disclosing a few examples, for claims that could signifi-
cantly impede follow-on invention (such as Heuer’s) a more searching review 
may be advisable. Here, the question becomes whether Heuer disclosed suffi-
cient embodiments to justify the relatively broad language in his proposed 
claim. In other words, does the disclosure justify the scope of preclusion of po-
tential follow-on inventions embodying the general method claimed? This 
analysis will turn on the views of experts and others skilled in the relevant art, 
and thus, we cannot answer the § 101 scope question at issue in Heuer here. In-
deed, because this sort of analysis will not always be straightforward, we sug-
gest that it be done last in any given case, after a review for novelty, nonob-
viousness, utility, and § 112 disclosure requirements. 
Another difficult case under our test arises in the context of sports moves— 
such as patenting a new type of curveball. In some sense, a pitcher throwing a 
curveball might be argued to pass the machine-or-transformation test in the 
sense that the pitcher’s body and the ball’s location, velocity, and spin are 
 
140. See Ex parte Heuer, No. 2009-004590, 2010 WL 3072973, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 
2010). 
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transformed.141 The common intuition, however, is that this sort of claim 
should not be patentable subject matter, either because it does not concern 
technology or is too far afield from what is typically patentable. Apparently for 
this reason, the proposed PTO guidelines categorically classify “human beha-
vior,” particularly “exercising,” as an example of a “general concept” that 
weighs against patent eligibility. Yet some human behavior—indeed, even 
some forms of exercise—should be eligible subject matter. Consider, for exam-
ple, a novel method of exercising that helps relieve knee pain. Under the ma-
chine-or-transformation test, it is difficult to distinguish new exercise that is de-
signed to cure a malady from one that merely increases the number of stri-
strikeouts.  
However, under our proposed test—whether the claim is moored to specif-
ic, practical application—these distinctions are not as arbitrary. In particular, a 
novel exercise that helps cure knee pain would be a specific, practical applica-
tion of the inventive ideas underlying the exercise. And this application would 
generally not foreclose other inventors from devising some new exercise to 
cure knee pain.  
So too with a novel method of throwing a particular kind of curveball. A 
new motion that leads to a particular practical result with a baseball should 
probably be patentable. Arguably, patenting would not prevent follow-on in-
vention if the claims were narrow. If, however, the claim were to every method 
of controlling ball motion using spin, then the claim would be more generative 
and likely too abstract. Pitching doesn’t change rapidly. Nor is the claim not 
applied—this seems a very specific application of the general inventive prin-
ciple. This is not to say that a new curveball is otherwise patentable—it may be 
obvious, it may not have operable utility, or it may not be definite. It is, howev-
er, allowable subject matter.142 
 CONCLUSION 
The abstract ideas limitation on patentable subject matter has long been a 
puzzle, one Bilski did little to resolve. We think the dominant conception of 
§ 101 as a gatekeeper, excluding certain inventions from the patent system al-
together, is wrong. We don’t exclude inventions from patentability because the 
invention is too abstract. We refuse to patent certain claims when those claims 
reach too broadly and thereby threaten downstream innovation. Reconceiving 
abstract ideas as a scope limitation not only helps to explain the case law, but it 
 
141. See Magliocca, supra note 52, at 876 n.7. 
142. There may, of course, be “fairness” concerns in the game that counsel in favor of 
allowing pitchers to freely throw a new type of curveball, but such issues are best handled by 
league rules and not by courts determining what should be patentable. See Risch, supra note 
61, at 645. 
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avoids the disastrous consequences associated with the machine-or-
transformation test. 
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